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People assume that only the U.S. has class actions, and that assumption is 
increasingly wrong.  The existence of mass harms with large numbers of 
claimants has created challenges for access to justice, judicial efficiency, and 
the enforcement of legal norms that make traditional individual litigation 
unworkable.  Therefore, many European countries are struggling to craft 
procedural mechanisms to allow the resolution of group claims in a way that 
incorporates the helpful parts of U.S. class actions while avoiding its 
inefficiencies and potential abuses.   
This Article will discuss the current debate in Belgium.  It begins, in part 
I, by putting that debate in the European context and by describing the 
current Belgian dilemma.  Part II sets out three proposals for a Belgian class 
action device, highlighting their common elements, as well as their 
difficulties.  Part III analyzes those proposals in light of class action theory 
(class action goals, standing, funding and financing, remedies, and the role of 
the courts), arguing that none of the proposals have been sufficiently thought 
out and that each needs amendment or elaboration.  Finally, part IV 
concludes by putting the civil class action in the larger context of processes 
for dealing with group harms and argues that a holistic approach is needed. 
I.  THE CURRENT SITUATION 
A.  European Background 
In 2007, a prominent Dutch scholar wrote that resolving and 
administering mass cases in Europe is a priority.  “It is clear that resolving 
mass cases must be prioritized, and that possible obstacles in the law must be 
cleared out, even when they have their foundation in important principles.  It 
is clear that there is dynamism in this part of the law.”2  
In the European orbit, however, this dynamism differs significantly.  
Three categories can be discerned.  First, some European countries have 
class action-like tools.  With the exception of Iceland, the European 
frontrunners are the Scandinavian countries; Sweden, Norway, Denmark and 
Finland.3  All of them have some sort of class action mechanism, although 
there are substantial differences from the American-style class action, 
particularly with respect to standing (with a preference for associations and 
public actors as class representatives), and opt-in versus opt-out (with a 
preference for opt-in).4  Despite their clear power, or maybe because of it, 
                                                                                                                   
 2  Ton Hartlief, De twee werelden van massaschade, 41 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 2595 
(2007). 
 3 STEFAAN VOET, EEN BELGISCHE VERTEGENWOORDIGENDE COLLECTIEVE RECHTSVORDERING 
109–13 (2012). 
 4 Generally, American class actions are initiated by a member of the class.  See FED. R. CIV. 
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these class actions are rarely filed as lawsuits and primarily serve as big 
sticks to encourage large corporations to avoid certain behaviors or to settle.  
In 2007, the Finnish Consumer Ombudsman was given exclusive standing to 
bring an opt-in class action.5  In 2009, the Finnish Consumer Agency 
assessed that “the mere presence of the shadow of class action gives the 
business sector an incentive for better legal compliance.”6  The same is true 
in Denmark, where a public enforcer, the Danish Ombudsman, has exclusive 
standing to bring an opt-out class action.7  The Ombudsman uses the tool as a 
“nuclear bomb”8 to compel wrongdoers into a settlement that includes 
behavior modification and restitution. 
                                                                                                                   
P. 23(a).  Most Scandinavian countries, with the exception of Finland, also permit an individual 
group member to initiate a class action.  See Section 4 of the Swedish Group Proceedings Act of 
2002, English translation available at http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/02/77/67/bcbe1f4f. 
pdf; Section 35-3(1)(a) of the Norwegian Dispute Act of 2005, English translation available at 
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-20050617-090-eng.pdf; Section 254(c) of the Danish 
Administration of Justice Act of 1992.  On the other hand, these jurisdictions also permit an 
ideological plaintiff (e.g., an association or an ombudsman), see infra Part III.B.1, to start a class 
action.  See Sections 5 and 6 of the Swedish Group Proceedings Act; Sections 1-4 and 35-3(1)(b) 
of the Norwegian Dispute Act; Section 254(c) of the Danish Administration of Justice Act; 
Section 4 of the Finnish Act on Class Actions No. 444/2007, English translation available at 
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/2007/en20070444.pdf. 
  American damages class actions are opt-out class actions.  See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(c)(3)(B).  Sweden and Finland have an exclusive opt-in system.  See Section 14 of the 
Swedish Group Proceedings Act and Section 8 of the Finnish Act on Class Actions No. 
444/2007.  In Norway and Denmark, opt-in is the default.  See Section 35-6 of the Norwegian 
Dispute Act and Section 254(e)(6) of the Danish Administration of Justice Act.  
Exceptionally, the judge can impose an opt-out system in certain circumstances (e.g., in small 
claims cases).  See Section 35-7 of the Norwegian Dispute Act; Section 254(e)(8) of the 
Danish Administration of Justice Act. 
 5 Act on Class Actions No. 444/2007, supra note 4; see also Petra Kiurunen, Finland, in 
WORLD CLASS ACTIONS. A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 
214 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012); Mikko Välimäki, Introducing Class Actions in Finland: An 
Example of Lawmaking Without Economic Analysis (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1261623; Klaus Viitanen, Finland, 622 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 209, 209 (2009).  The complete version of this report is available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Finland_National_Report.pdf. 
 6 Consumer Agency, The Threat of Class Action Has Improved the Consumer’s Position, 
CURRENT ISSUES IN CONSUMER L. (Feb. 2009), http://www.kuluttajavirasto.fi/en-GB/050209_ 
eng/. 
 7 Danish Administration of Justice Act, supra note 4, Ch. 23(a); see also Trine Bogelund, 
Introduction of Class Actions in Denmark, Young Lawyers’ Committee Newsletter (Int’l Bar 
Ass’n), Sept. 2007, at 24, available at http://www.lett.dk/Files/Filer/PDF/Young_Lawyers_new 
sletter_Sept_2007.pdf; Petra Kiurunen, Niklas Lindström & Michala Bylov Rath, Denmark, in 
WORLD CLASS ACTIONS.  A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE 
GLOBE 186 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012); Justits Ministeriet, New Rules on Class Actions 
under Danish Law (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/rules. 
pdf; Erik Werlauff, Class Actions in Denmark, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 202, 
202 (2009). 
 8 A term the Danish Ombudsman (Mr. Henrik Øe) has used at various conferences. 
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Second, various jurisdictions have created instruments (sometimes 
experimental) to achieve collective redress.  Three examples are worth 
mentioning: England and Wales, Germany, and the Netherlands.  Despite an 
ineffective and inactive representative action procedure,9 England and Wales 
have a Group Litigation Order procedure as a management tool to coordinate 
the adjudication of individual procedures that give rise to common issues.10  
In November 2008, the Civil Justice Council proposed to introduce an opt-
out class action applicable in all areas of the law.11  The English Ministry of 
Justice was reluctant, and believes that class actions should only be 
considered in specific areas of the law, “only where there is evidence of 
need, and [only] following an assessment of economic and other impacts and 
consideration of alternative approaches.”12 
The 2005 German Act on Model Case Proceedings in the Capital Markets 
(KapMuG) established a model, or test case procedure, of which the core is 
to detect common issues of law in a multitude of individual cases, have them 
decided by a higher court, and resolve the previously suspended individual 
cases taking into account the outcome of the test case.13  The KapMuG was 
                                                                                                                   
 9 CIV. P.R. 19.6 (U.K.); see also ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE 509 (2d ed. 2006). 
 10 CIV. P.R. 19.10–.15 (U.K.); see also Neil Andrews, Multi-Party Proceedings in England: 
Representative and Group Actions, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 249, 258 (2001); Laurel 
Harbour & John Evans, The United Kingdom, in WORLD CLASS ACTIONS. A GUIDE TO GROUP 
AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 169 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012); 
CHRISTOPHER HODGES, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS 3 (2001); Christopher Hodges, England and 
Wales, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 105, 109–10 (2009).  The complete version of 
this report is available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Eng 
land_Country%20Report.pdf; see also RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON 
LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 67–111 (2004) (describing the English 
approach to group litigation). 
 11 CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: 
DEVELOPING A MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 5 (John 
Sorabji et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2FDocuments%2FCJ 
C%2FPublications%2FCJC+papers%2FCJC+Improving+Acccess+to+Justice+through+Collecti
ve+Actions.pdf; see also Laurel Harbour, John Evans, Erwan Poisson & Camille Fléchet, 
Representative Actions and Proposed Reforms in The European Union, in WORLD CLASS 
ACTIONS.  A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 156–59 
(Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012) (discussing the proposed reforms in the UK). 
 12 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL’S 
REPORT: ‘IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTIONS’ (2009), available at 
http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/uploads/Government_Response_20th_July_2009.pdf; Christopher 
Hodges, Response to Consultation on “Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation on 
Options for Reform” (Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford University No. OX1 3UQ), 
available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/1207ResponsetoUKBISonConsultationonCom 
petitionPrivateActions.pdf. 
 13 Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case Act], Oct. 
2, 2011, ELEKTRONISCHER BUDESANZEIGER [eBAnz.] (Ger.).  An English translation is available 
at http://www.bmj.de/cln_102/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/KapMuG_english.html; see also 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013 9:56 AM 
438  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:433 
an experimental act for five years.  In 2012, the KapMuG was not only 
extended to 2020, but the German legislature also modified the procedure.14  
The most salient amendment, and one probably inspired by the Dutch 
Collective Settlements Act, is the possibility for the court to approve a 
settlement between the model claimant and the defendant that becomes 
binding on all parties, unless they opt-out.   
The 2005 Dutch Collective Settlements Act provides for settlement-only 
class actions.15  An association or (special purpose) foundation, 
representing the victims of a mass harm, tries to reach an all-embracing 
settlement with the wrongdoer.  This settlement is then approved by the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which has exclusive jurisdiction.  Class 
members who disapprove of the settlement can opt out.  If not, they are 
bound by the court decision approving the settlement.16  To date, six high 
                                                                                                                   
Moritz Bälz & Felix Blobel, Collective Litigation German Style: The Act on Model Proceedings 
in Capital Market Disputes, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 126, 135–38 (Eckart 
Gottschalk et al. eds., 2007); Peter Gottwald, On the Extension of Collective legal Protection in 
German, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 484, 492–94 (2007); Hans-W. Micklitz & Astrid Stadler, The 
Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure, 17 
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1473, 1485–88 (2006); Luidger Röckrath, Germany, in WORLD CLASS 
ACTIONS. A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 241 (Paul G. 
Karlsgodt ed., 2012); Michael Stürner, Model Case Proceedings in the Capital Markets: 
Tentative Steps Towards Group Litigation in Germany, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 250, 252–53 (2007). 
 14 Gesetz zur Reform des Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes [KapMuG] [Capital 
Markets Model Cast Act Amendment], Oct. 25, 2012, ELEKTRONISCHER BUNDESANZEIGER 
[eBAnz.] (Ger.).  A full text version of the act is available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/ 
17/101/1710160.pdf.  For an analysis and suggestions for reform see Eberhard Feess & Axel 
Halfmeier, The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG): A European Role Model 
for Increasing the Efficiency of Capital Markets? Analysis and Suggestions for Reform (Jan. 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684528. 
 15 See Jeroen Fleming & Jaap J. Kuster, The Netherlands, in WORLD CLASS ACTIONS. A GUIDE  
TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 286 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed.,  
2012); Ruud Hermans & Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, International Class Action Settlements in  
the Netherlands Since Converium, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO:  
CLASS & GROUP ACTIONS 2012, at 5–9 (2011); Ianika Tzankova & Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer,  
The Netherlands, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 149, 149 (2009) (“Under the [Dutch 
Collective Settlements Act], parties that have agreed to settle a mass damage claim may request  
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to certify the settlement, as a result of which it becomes binding  
on the group . . . unless they opt out.”).  The complete version of this report is available at http:// 
globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Netherlands_National_Report.pdf.   
Marie-José van der Heijden, Class Actions, in NETHERLANDS REPORTS TO THE EIGHTEENTH 
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 197, 197 (J.H.M. van Erp & P.W. Van Vliet 
eds., 2010). 
 16 The procedure is described in Articles 7:900–:910 of the BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] 
[Dutch Civil Code] (Neth.) and Articles 1013–1018 of WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE 
RECHTSVORDERING [Rv] [Dutch Judicial Code] (Neth.). An English translation of the Dutch 
Civil Code is available at http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook077.htm and an 
English translation of the Dutch Judicial Code is available at http://dutchcivillaw.com/legislati 
on/civilprocedure033.htm.  
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profile cases have been treated under this act.17  The most recent decision 
of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in Converium appears to have had an 
impact on global securities class actions.  In its November 2010 decision, 
the court ruled, based on the EEX and EVEX Regulations,18 it had 
international jurisdiction to approve the settlement for non-U.S. class 
members, even though the class mainly consisted of non-Dutch class 
members.19  In its final decision of January 2012, the court declared the 
settlement binding on all class members.20  In a decision that surprised 
many European commentators, the court demonstrated it had no problem 
with the contingency fee arrangement for the American lawyers, which 
involved up to 20% of the amount of the settlement.21  After the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd. 
invalidated class actions brought in the U.S. on behalf of foreign class 
members,22 Amsterdam is poised to become the settlement hub for claims 
involving non-U.S. class members in mass securities cases.23 
                                                                                                                   
 17 Hof – Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, JOR 2012, 51 m nt. BJ de Jong (Converium) (Neth.) 
[hereinafter Converium II]; Hof –Amsterdam 15 juli 2009, JOR 325 m nt. Scholten en Van 
Achterberg (In de zaak van Randstand Holding N.V.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Vedior]; Hof – 
Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 195 m nt. AFJA Leitjen (Shell Petroleum/Dexia Bank 
Nederland N.V.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Shell]; Hof – Amsterdam 29 april 2009, JOR 2009, 196 
m nt. AFJA Leitjen (Neth.) [hereinafter Vie d’Or]; Hof – Amsterdam 25 januari 2007, JOR 
2007, 71 m nt. AFJA Leitjen (Dexia Bank Nederland N.V./Stitching Platform Aandelenlease) 
(Neth.) [hereinafter Dexia]; Hof – Amsterdam 1 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 461 m nt. (Bayer 
AG/WXYZ) (Neth.) [hereinafter DES].  All decisions are available in Dutch at http://zoeken. 
rechtspraak.nl/default.aspx.  The DES case was a pharmaceutical product liability case.  All 
the other cases were securities cases.  
 18 Council Regulation 44/2001 Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) (EC) [hereinafter EEX 
Regulation]; Convention of Sept. 16, 1988 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1659 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter EVEX 
Convention].  
 19 Hof – Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 M nt. J.S. Kortmann (Converium) 
(Neth.) [hereinafter Converium I].  The Amsterdam Court of Appeals claimed jurisdiction 
based on Articles 2.2, 6.1, and 5.1 of the EEX Regulation, supra note 18.  
 20 Converium II, supra note 17. 
 21 Contingency fees are strictly prohibited in Europe because they violate public order and 
are incompatible with attorneys’ professional ethics.  See infra Part III.C.2. 
 22 130 S. Ct. 2869 (U.S. 2010). 
 23 Jeroen Kortmann & Marieke Bredenoord-Spoek, The Netherlands: A ‘Hotspot for Class 
Actions’?, 4 GLOBAL COMPETITION LITIG. REV. 13, 13 (2011); see also Tomas Arons & 
William H. Van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities Claim 
Settlements from the Netherlands, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 857 (2010) (describing the potential 
export value of the WCAM procedure); Bart Krans, The Dutch Class Action (Financial 
Settlement) Act in an International Context: The Shell Case and the Converium Case, 31 CIV. 
JUST. Q. 141–50 (2012) (noting the jurisdictional problems if other European countries do not 
recognize the Amsterdam court’s decisions or reading of EEX regulations); HÉLÈNE VAN LITH, 
THE DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS ACT AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011). 
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Third and finally, some European states have no adequate instruments to 
tackle mass cases.  Although in June 2012 the new French Minister of 
Justice, Christiane Taubira, re-launched the idea of introducing class 
actions,24 and in May 2013 a concrete proposal for a consumer class action 
was presented to the Council of Ministers,25 France, for the moment, only 
has a joint representative action for consumers and investors (action en 
représentation conjointe).26  Its scope is very limited.27  Only national 
nonprofit organizations representing consumers or investors have standing.28  
Moreover, they work on an opt-in basis by soliciting for individual mandates.  
This can only be done through newspapers and magazines, but not via TV or 
radio.29  
Belgium also belongs to this last category.  Together with France, it is 
one of the last Mohicans in the European collective redress orbit.30  As 
discussed hereafter, this is caused by the Belgian Supreme Court’s rigorous 
interpretation of the existing standing rules and the deficient instruments to 
deal with mass cases. 
B.  Current Belgian Law 
1. Rigorous Supreme Court Interpretation 
Traditional Belgian requirements analogous to U.S. standing doctrine 
prevent the initiation of class actions.  The bottom line is that, according to 
Belgian law and the Belgian Supreme Court, natural or legal persons have 
standing only to initiate an action in which they defend an existing, 
                                                                                                                   
 24 Valérie Brioux et al., Justice: Christiane Taubira Veut Autoriser les «Class Actions», Le 
Parisien, June 22, 2012 (Fr.), available at http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/christiane-taubira 
-veut-autoriser-les-class-actions-22-06-2012-2060771.php; see also Harbour, Evans, Poisson & 
Fléchet, supra note 11, at 159–67 (discussing the proposed reforms in France). 
 25 Chasseurs d’ambulaces, ECONOMIST, May 11, 2013, at 62. 
 26 Véronique Magnier, France, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 114, 116–18 
(2009); Erwan Poisson & Camille Fléchet, France, in WORLD CLASS ACTIONS. A GUIDE TO 
GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 323 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012). 
 27 See Magnier, supra note 26, at 117 (concluding that the current rules on soliciting class 
members “are not fitted for class actions initiated by lawyers and that many changes in ethics 
and the law would need to occur before group litigation could exist in France”).  The complete 
version of this report is available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/do 
cuments/France_National_Report.pdf. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See generally Piet Taelman & Stefaan Voet, Belgium and Collective Redress: The Last of 
the European Mohicans, in THE BELGIAN REPORTS AT THE CONGRESS OF WASHINGTON OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 305 (Eric Dirix & Yves-Henri Leleu eds., 
2011). 
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immediate, personal, and direct interest.31  They can neither defend the 
general (nor public) interest,32 nor the interests of persons in a similar 
situation. 
Any legal action in Belgium is subject to two preliminary legal 
requirements.  Article 17 of the Judicial Code states that an action will not be 
admitted if the plaintiff lacks the required legal capacity.33  This is the 
authority (the power), the basis of which allows an action to be initiated.  
Article 17 also requires that a party desiring to bring an action before court 
must show a legal interest.34  If the party is unable to show an interest, the 
action will be inadmissible.  The interest is any material or moral stimulus or 
incentive why an action is initiated.35  
Article 18 of the Judicial Code expands upon the notion of interest: when 
the action is initiated, the interest must already exist and must be 
immediate.36  There is one exception.  An action will be admissible if it 
prevents the infringement of a right that is seriously threatened.  This is 
called an actio ad futurum and permits a claim for declaratory relief.37  Case 
law attaches a further condition to the interest prerequisite: it must be 
personal and direct.  The pivotal case in that respect is the November 19, 
1982 Eikendael case of the Belgian Supreme Court.38  The Court stated that:  
Unless the law states otherwise, an action initiated by a natural 
or legal person is inadmissible if the plaintiff does not have a 
personal and direct interest.  A general interest (i.e., the interest 
of a class of people) is no personal and direct interest.  The 
personal and direct interest of a legal person is only that which 
                                                                                                                   
 31 See CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] arts. 17–18 (Belg.) and the 
Eikendael doctrine discussed infra note 38. 
 32 See CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 138 (Belg.) (the public 
prosecutor ensures the protection of the public interest). 
 33 Id. art. 17 ; see also GEORGES DE LEVAL, ÉLÉMENTS DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE 22 (2003) 
(defining capacity as “le pouvoir en vertu duquel une personne exerce l’action en justice”); 
ALBERT FETTWEIS, MANUEL DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE 48 (1985). 
 34 See DE LEVAL, supra note 33, at 15 (defining interest as “tout avantage, matériel ou 
moral, effectif mais non théorique que le demandeur peut retirer de la demande au moment où 
il la forme”); FETTWEIS, supra note 33, at 48. 
 35 JACQUES VAN COMPERNOLLE, LE DROIT D’ACTION EN JUSTICE DES GROUPEMENTS 383 
(1972) (“L’utilité que présente pour celui qui agit la mesure qu’il sollicite.”). 
 36 CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 18, sec. 1.1 (Belg.). 
 37 DE LEVAL, supra note 33, at 21; CHARLES VAN REEPINGHEN, VERSLAG VAN DE 
GERECHTELIJKE HERVORMING I 43 (1968). 
 38 Cour de Cassation [Cass.][Court of Cassation], Nov. 4, 1982, PAS. 1983, I, No. 338 
(Belg.) [hereinafter Eikendael];  see also Cour de Cassation [Cass.][Court of Cassation], Oct. 
25, 1985, PAS. 1986, I, No. 219 (Belg.); Cour de Cassation [Cass.][Court of Cassation], Oct. 
16, 1991, PAS. 1992, I, No. 129 (Belg.); Court de Cassation [Cass][Court of Cassation], Sept. 
19, 1996, PAS. 1996, I, No. 830 (Belg.) (rulings that confirmed the Eikendael judgment). 
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affects her existence or material or moral goods, especially her 
assets, honor and good name.  The fact that a natural or legal 
person pursues a goal, even a statutory one, does not imply that 
she has a personal and direct interest.39  
The Belgian Supreme Court could have allowed class actions through 
case law.  However, on the basis of this strict precedent, it is generally 
acknowledged that collective and class actions are not admissible in Belgian 
civil courts, unless the legislature allows it expressly.40   
2.  Dealing with Mass Harms Without Class Actions 
In Belgium, there are currently four ways to deal with mass harms: 
joinder of claims and claims in intervention, party representation, statutory 
collective actions, and, in criminal cases, the piggyback technique.  Belgian 
law does not allow class actions for damages.  This Article defines a class 
action as a representative action in which one person or association 
represents an unidentified class of people similarly situated, without them 
having to intervene as parties, but that are bound by the outcome of the 
procedure.   
First, the Belgian Judicial Code and Civil Code contain some procedural 
techniques that are traditionally used for multi-party actions.41  Joinder of 
claims allows several claims between two or more parties to be filed 
together (in one writ of summons or petition) when they are connected.42  
Claims are connected when they should be tried together in order to 
prevent contradictory decisions.43  The technique of claims in intervention 
makes it possible for third parties to intervene in pending proceedings.44  
The intervention can take place voluntarily (by way of petition)45 or 
coercively (by way of writ of summons).46  In this context, and contrary to, 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Eikendael, supra note 38.  This translation is that of the author. 
 40 VOET, supra note 3, at 32, 36.  
 41 Piet Taelman & Emilie De Baere, New Trends in Standing and Res Judicata in Collective 
Suits (Belgium), in THE XIIITH WORLD CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW: THE BELGIAN AND 
DUTCH REPORTS 6 (A.W. Jongbloed ed., 2008); Taelman & Voet, supra note 30, at 323–25. 
 42 CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 701 (Belg.).  Article 701 of the 
Judicial Code.  A distinction is made between objective accumulation (a party formulates 
different claims against another party in a single procedure), passive subjective accumulation 
(a plaintiff acts against several defendants in a single procedure), and active subjective 
accumulation (several plaintiffs act against one or several defendants in a single procedure).  
See VOET, supra note 3, at 23. 
 43 CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 30 (Belg.). 
 44 Id. arts. 15–16, 811–814. 
 45 Id. art. 813, sec. 1.  
 46 Id. art. 813, sec. 2. 
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for example, England and the U.S.,47 it has to be underlined that a Belgian 
judge is not allowed to involve sua sponte parties in the proceedings.48  
When the judge comes to the conclusion that there are victims similarly 
situated to the plaintiff, he cannot instruct their intervention, nor can he ask 
(or force) parties to do so, nor can he suspend the proceedings in that 
respect. 
Second, the most used technique to deal with mass harms is party 
representation, which makes it possible for a natural or legal person (the 
representative) to represent a group of individuals if he or she received an 
explicit mandate from each individual member of the group.49  In such cases, 
only the class members who gave a mandate will be represented in court and 
considered a party to the proceedings.  From a procedural point of view, the 
technique implies that as a result of a dispute over a substantive right, the 
holder of that right grants another (natural or legal) person the power to 
initiate the action resulting from a violation of that substantive right.  The 
representative does not have to show a personal interest, but only show that 
the represented persons have an existing, immediate, personal, and direct 
interest.50  
Third, the legislature has created limited statutory exceptions.51  In 
implementing multiple European directives, the Belgian legislature created a 
series of statutory collective actions.52  Collective actions are general interest 
actions “in which the individuals whose interests are involved cannot be 
identified because of the generality of the interest.”  They are to be 
distinguished from group actions “where some form of identification or 
demarcation is still possible.”53 
Belgian statutory collective actions have five common characteristics:54  
                                                                                                                   
 47 CIV. P.R. 19.2(2) (U.K.); FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (only for an indispensable party).  
 48 CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 811 (Belg.); see also infra Part 
III.E.2 (discussing the active role of the class action judge). 
 49 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1984–2010 (Belg.); Hubert Bocken & Bernadette 
Demeulenare, The Defence of Collective Interests in Belgian Civil Procedure, in BELGIAN 
REPORT AT THE II INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW 161 (1983); Matthias E. 
Storme & Evelyn Terryn, Belgium, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95, 97 (2009).  
The complete version of this report is available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/conte 
nt/belgium-report-class-actions. 
 50 Hubert Bocken, Schorsingsbevoegdheid milieuverenigingen, in PROCEDEREN IN NIEUW 
BELGIË EN KOMEND EUROPA 134–35 (1991); VOET, supra note 3, at 26. 
 51 The first words of the Eikendael decision are: “Unless the law states otherwise.”  
Eikendael, supra note 38. 
 52 For examples, see infra notes 59–64. 
 53 Arons & Van Boom, supra note 23, at 862. 
 54 VOET, supra note 3, at 44–46. 
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(1) they are an exception to the standing rules in Articles 17 
and 18 of the Judicial Code;55 
(2) they implement European directives;56  
(3) only private professional, inter-professional, or public 
associations (or organizations) that satisfy certain legal 
criteria (e.g., having legal personality for some years, 
usually three), have standing to bring them;  
(4) those associations or organizations can only institute an 
injunctive action (i.e. the cessation of an illegal practice) 
or a preventive action;57 and  
(5) the cause of action must correspond (overlap) with the 
statutory aim of the association or organization. 
These types of collective actions exist with respect to consumer 
protection, misleading advertising, unfair contract terms and long distance 
agreements, the amicable recovery of consumer debts, the environment, 
discrimination and racism, copyright, etc.58  Some examples: 
–  The Act of March 24, 2003 on Essential Banking Services 
gives standing to professional, inter-professional, and 
consumer organizations that have legal personality, and 
either are a member of the Council for Consumption or 
have been approved by the Minister for Economic Affairs 
to bring an injunctive action before the President of the 
Commercial Court in order to stop any act or activity 
prohibited by the Act;59 
–  Pursuant to the Act of January 12, 1993 on the Collective 
Action for the Protection of the Environment, certain 
associations (i.e., non-profit organizations having legal 
                                                                                                                   
 55 See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the significance of Articles 17 and 18). 
 56 For example, the 2002 Act on Cross Border Injunctions implements Directive 98/27/EC 
on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests; the Belgian anti-discrimination acts 
implement Directives 2000/43/EC on equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin, 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment and occupation, and 
2004/113/EC on equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of 
goods and services, etc.  See VOET, supra note 3, at 44. 
 57 Christine Dalcq, Les actions “comme en référé,” in LE RÉFÉRÉ JUDICIAIRE 168–71 
(Jacques Englebert & Hakim Boularbah eds., 2003); see also Pierre Ramquet & Valérie Jones, 
Belgium, in SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS 49 (Marc Jobert ed., 2000) (discussing collective actions 
with respect to consumer cases). 
 58 For a detailed overview of the areas of law subject to these types of collective action suits 
see Taelman & Voet, supra note 30, at 319–22. 
 59 Loi instaurant un service bancaire de base [Essential Banking Act] of Mar. 24, 2003, 
MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 15, 2003, 26402. 
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personality for at least three years, having environmental 
protection as their statutory aim, and that are able to 
demonstrate they are active in protecting collective 
environmental interests) can bring an injunctive action 
before the President of the Court of First Instance to stop 
any act or activity that violates environmental 
regulations;60 
–  Under the Act of July 30, 1981 tending to Penalize Racist 
and Xenophobic Acts (Racism Act),61 the Act of May 10, 
2007 on Discrimination of Women and Men (Gender 
Act),62 and the Act of May 10, 2007 on Certain Forms of 
Discrimination (General Non Discrimination Act),63 anti-
discrimination associations64 have standing to initiate an 
injunctive action to stop any discriminatory behavior. 
The procedural provisions for these collective actions are scattered in 
different statutes dedicated to substantive law.  Several proposals have been 
submitted to Parliament to consolidate them into one procedural statute.  The 
idea is to make a clean sweep and create one standardized legal ground, on 
the basis of which associations or organizations that satisfy certain legal 
criteria have standing to initiate a collective action to defend collective 
interests, so long as the cause of action corresponds with their statutory aim. 
The most recent proposal dates from July 14, 2011.65  To date, this and all 
other similar proposals have not been enacted.66  
                                                                                                                   
 60 Loi concernant un droit d’action en matiére de protection de l’environnement [Collective 
Action for the Protection of the Environment Act] of Jan. 12, 1993, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] 
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Feb. 19, 1993, 3769, available at http://environnement.walloni 
e.be/legis/general/acenv001.htm. 
 61 Loi tendant á réprimer certains actes inspires par le racisme ou la xénophobie [Racism 
Act] of July 30, 1981, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 8, 1981, 
9928. 
 62 Loi tendant á lutter contre la discrimination entre les femmes et les homes [Gender Act] 
of May 10, 2007, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 30, 2007, 2d 
ed., 29031. 
 63 Loi tendant à lutter contre certaines formes de discrimination [General Non 
Discrimination Act] of May 10, 2007, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], 
May 30, 2007, 2d ed., 29016.  
 64 These include any organization that has legal personality for at least three years and has 
the protection of human rights or opposition to discrimination as its statutory aim.  Some of 
these organizations include the Centre for the Equality of Chances and Opposition to Racism, 
the Institute for the Equality of Women and Men, representative employees’ and employers’ 
organizations, and institutions of public utility. 
 65 Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Proposition de Loi modifiant le Code judiciaire 
en vue d’accorder aux associations le droit d’introduire une action d’intérêt collectif 
[Proposal to Amend the Judicial Code to Allow Collective Actions for Associations], 2e 
Session de la 53e legislature, Doc. 1680/001, July 14, 2011, available at http://www.dekame 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013 9:56 AM 
446  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:433 
Fourth and finally, there is the piggyback, or partie civile, technique for 
crime victims.  In most common law systems, the victim is absent in a 
criminal trial.  He or she can, and in most cases will, be called as a witness 
but is not a formal party to the criminal proceedings.  The victim cannot 
claim his or her damages during the criminal trial, and may do so only in a 
separate civil case.67  In Belgium and other European countries, such as 
France, this is different.68  The victim is a formal party to the criminal 
proceedings, just as the Public Prosecutor and the defendant are formal 
parties.  There is no jury.  In most cases victims will bring their civil claims 
during the criminal proceedings.69  After the criminal judge has dealt with 
                                                                                                                   
r.be/FLWB/PDF/53/1680/53K1680001.pdf. 
 66 Unlike in Belgium, this unification process was successfully done in the Netherlands, 
which have similar statutory collective actions.  In 1994 under the influence of the Dutch 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, all these actions were abolished and replaced by one uniform 
provision.  
1. A foundation or association with full legal capacity that, according to its 
articles of association, seeks to protect specific interests may bring to court a 
legal claim that intends to protect similar interests of other persons.  2. A 
legal person filing a claim referred to in paragraph 1 is inadmissible if he, in 
the given circumstances, has made insufficient attempts to reach a settlement 
over the claim through consultations with the defendant.  A period of two 
weeks after the defendant has received a request for such consultations, 
indicating what is claimed, shall in any event be sufficient to this end.  3. A 
legal claim referred to in paragraph 1 may be brought to court in order to 
force the defendant to disclose the judicial decision to the public, in a way as 
set by court and at the cost of the persons as pointed out by the court.  It 
cannot be filed in order to obtain compensatory damages.  4. A legal action 
referred to in paragraph 1 cannot be based on specific behaviour as far as the 
person who is harmed by this behaviour opposes the action.  5. A judicial 
decision has no effect with respect to a person whose interests are protected 
by the legal action, but who has made clear that he does not want to be 
affected by this decision, unless the nature of the judicial decision brings 
along that it is not possible to exclude this specific person from its effect  
BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [Dutch Civil Code] art. 3:305(a) (Neth.).  See Arons & Van 
Boom, supra note 23, at 862–65 (describing the 1994 Act on Collective Action); Tzankova & 
Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 15, at 152 (discussing the history of collective actions in the 
Netherlands). 
 67 Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation, 32 J. 
LAW & SOC. 294 (2005). 
 68 For a general overview of Belgian criminal procedure, see Brigitte Pesquié, The Belgian 
System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 81, 81–141 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. 
Spencer eds., 2002).  
 69 STEPHEN O’MALLEY & ALEXANDER LAYTON, EUROPEAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1171, 1183 
(1989).  See Section 4 of the Preliminary Title of the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure.  
CODE D’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE [C.I.Cr.] ch. 1, § 4 (Belg.).  For an analysis of the Belgian 
piggyback, or partie civile, technique see CHRIS VAN DEN WYNGAERT, STRAFRECHT, 
STRAFPROCESRECHT & INTERNATIONAAL STRAFRECHT (6th ed.) 780–803 (2006); RAF 
VERSTRAETEN, DIRK VAN DAELE, ANN BAILLEUX & JOOST HUYSMANS, DE BURGERLIJKE 
PARTIJSTELLING: ANALYSE EN TOEKOMSTPERSPECTIEF 19–76 (2012) (who also give an 
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the criminal aspect of the case and has convicted the defendant, he or she 
will rule upon the civil claims.  In the event the judge acquits the defendant, 
he or she will not rule upon the civil claim.  In that case, the victim can 
initiate a civil case based on another cause of action, such as negligence, if 
the defendant was acquitted of fraud.  But, the victim is barred from bringing 
a civil claim on the cause of action on which the defendant was acquitted.  
The gain for the victim in bringing his or her claim during the criminal 
proceedings is that he or she can “piggyback” on the evidence brought 
forward by the Public Prosecutor, thus he or she only has to prove damages 
and causation.  This technique may potentially have an important impact in 
mass cases.  In principle, the criminal case may function as a de facto issue 
class action on the issue of liability. 
3.  Where That Leaves Belgium Right Now 
The traditional procedural techniques, as well as the existing Belgian 
statutory collective actions and the piggyback technique, are deficient tools 
for the redress of collective harms.70  Their main weakness is their opt-in 
feature, which means they do not work for small claims. 
The techniques of joinder of claims and claims in intervention remain 
embedded in an individualistic context because they are exclusively designed 
for small party litigation.  Their only added value is that they allow the 
intervention of a limited number of people.  Furthermore, third parties have 
to intervene in the proceedings, and just like the initial plaintiff and 
defendant, they have to become formal parties to the proceeding.71  This is 
also the case for party representation.  The representative must be authorized 
by each individual member of the class on an opt-in basis.72  This technique 
                                                                                                                   
interesting comparative overview of the technique in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and 
Germany).  A victim can also choose not to piggyback on the criminal case, but rather initiate 
a civil case.  Where a concurrent criminal case against the same defendant is pending, the civil 
judge will have to suspend the civil case until the criminal judge has ruled on the criminal 
case.  This principle is phrased in the French adage: “le criminel tient le civil en état.”  It is 
also possible for a victim to use both tracks: bringing his or her civil claim during the criminal 
proceedings and piggybacking on the Public Prosecutor on the one hand, and initiating a 
separate civil case on the other hand.  This is done frequently in big cases when the statute of 
limitations in the criminal case could be tolled.  As a precaution, victims initiate civil 
proceedings as a backup; in case the criminal case is dismissed.  In most cases, and because of 
the “le criminel tient le civil en état”-rule, these civil proceedings are suspended awaiting the 
outcome of the criminal case.   
 70 Taelman & Voet, supra note 30, at 325. 
 71 See sources cited supra notes 41–48 (describing claim and party joinder in Belgium). 
 72 See sources cited supra note 49 (describing the requirements for party representation in 
Belgium). 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013 9:56 AM 
448  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:433 
involves laborious administration costs since the representative has to reach 
every member and obtain their written consent and authorization. 
Statutory collective actions are rarely used in Belgium.  Their biggest 
shortcoming is the impossibility of claiming damages, as they can only be 
used for injunctive or declaratory relief.73  Associations and organizations 
also lack financial means to initiate them.  As mentioned hereafter,74 
contingency fee arrangements are not possible in Belgium.  Moreover, the 
judgments in these cases are not binding for the individual class members.  If 
they want financial compensation, they must individually sue the 
defendant.75  Since they were not party to the proceedings initiated by the 
association or organization, they cannot invoke the claim preclusive effect of 
that decision, or the issue preclusive effect, since issue preclusion does not 
exist in Belgium.  
Most of the Belgian mass cases mentioned hereafter were criminal cases 
in which a combination of the piggyback, or partie civile, technique and 
party representation was used.  The civil parties (e.g., the deceived 
shareholders) gave a mandate to an association or organization to bring, on 
their behalf, their civil claim before the criminal judge.76  At first sight, one 
would think that the piggyback technique for class members only has 
advantages: it is easily accessible, informal, and cheap.  The drawback 
however is that it remains an opt-in system and all claimants are treated as 
separate parties.  All civil parties have to come forward and give a mandate 
to a representative.  In mass criminal cases, this opt-in requirement is simply 
unmanageable.  
II.  PROPOSALS FOR A BELGIAN CLASS ACTION 
A.  Trigger-Effect 
In most European countries, some tangible cases were a trigger for 
action.77  For example, the DES case (a pharmaceutical product liability case) 
in the Netherlands led to the Dutch Collective Settlements Act.78  The 
German KapMuG was created as a result of the Deutsche Telekom AG case 
                                                                                                                   
 73 See sources cited supra note 57 (describing statutory collective actions and the type of 
relief they provide party members). 
 74 See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing financing of class actions by class counsel). 
 75 VOET, supra note 3, at 46.  
 76 See cases discussed infra Part II. 
 77 VOET, supra note 3, at 49. 
 78 See Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 15, at 155 (describing the legislative 
changes needed to effectuate the DES settlement).  For a brief analysis of the DES case, with 
references, see John H. Wansink & Jaap Spier, Joint and Several Liability of DES 
Manufacturers: A Dutch Tort Crisis?, 1 INT’L INS. L. REV. 176 (1993). 
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(a securities case).79  During the last decades, Belgium was also confronted 
with a number of high-profile mass cases.80  
Some were single-incident mass torts involving personal injuries and 
death.  On New Year’s Eve 1994, a fire broke out in the Switel hotel in 
Antwerp.  Fifteen people were killed and 164 injured.  In June 1995, sixteen 
people died in a gas explosion of a road restaurant in Eynatten (in the 
province of Liège).  In February 1996, ten were killed and eighty injured in a 
multiple collision on a highway in Kruishoutem.  In the summer of 1997, a 
Jordan Falcon plane crashed during an air show in Ostend.  Eight bystanders 
were killed and forty injured.  On July 30, 2004, there was a gas explosion in 
the industrial zone of Ghislenghien (a small town in the province of 
Hainaut).  Twenty-four people were killed, 132 were injured, 400 people 
suffered damages and insurance companies had to pay €28,5 million.81  On 
February 15, 2010, two passenger trains collided in Halle (near Brussels). 
Eighteen people were killed and more than 100 were injured. In May 2013, a 
train transporting chemicals derailed in Wetteren. Dozens of people were 
injured. Hundreds could not go back to their houses for days.  
Others involved financial harms to shareholders.82  In 2001, Lernout & 
Hauspie Speech Products (L&H), a speech recognition technology company 
based in Ypres, went bankrupt due to overstated earnings, fictitious 
transactions, and improper accounting methodologies.83  During the criminal 
trial in 2007, it took several days for the more than 15,000 piggybacking 
victims to bring their civil claims.  After three years, in 2010 the court 
                                                                                                                   
 79 Stürner, supra note 13, at 252.  For an analysis of the Deutsche Telekom AG case, with 
references, see id. at 253.  On May 2012, the Frankfurt Court of Appeal issued the model 
decision in the Deutsche Telekom AG case.  The Court ruled in favor of Deutsche Telekom by 
deciding that there was no prospectus liability because there were no misrepresentations in 
Deutsche Telekom’s prospectus.  Oberlandesgericht [OLGZ] [Higher Regional Court – Civil 
Matters] May 16, 2012.  The decision is available in German at http://sustainableprivatelaw.fi 
les.wordpress.com/2012/06/musterentscheid_olg_frankfurt_am_main_telekom.pdf. 
 80 Most of these cases are analyzed in Taelman & Voet, supra note 30, at 325–27 and 
VOET, supra note 3, at 50–54.  
 81 This case was decided in appeal by the Court of Appeal of Mons. Cours d’Appel [CA] 
[Court of Appeal] Mons, June 28, 2011, NR 2010/H/130. 
 82 In the context of an international research collaborative, led by Professors Deborah 
Hensler (Stanford Law School), Christopher Hodges (Universities of Oxford and Rotterdam), 
and Ianika Tzankova (University of Tilburg), I have conducted an empirical study of the L&H 
case.  This case study (The L&H Case: Belgium’s Internet Bubble Story) will be published in 
2013 in a book. 
 83 Because L&H had a second headquarter in Burlington, MA, the case also led to some 
class action settlements in the U.S.  See, e.g., In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 138 F. 
Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001); In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 208 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. 
Mass. 2002); Warlop v. Lernout, 473 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2007) (granting defendants 
motion to dismiss the class action on forum non conveniens grounds where the class included 
mostly foreign investors who purchased L&H stock on the European Stock Exchange). 
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reached a criminal verdict, and the major administrators of L&H were 
convicted.84  Dexia and KPMG, L&H’s financial and accounting partners, 
were acquitted.  The civil claims are still pending.  In another example, as a 
result of the worldwide financial crisis in 2008, Fortis Bank, the crown jewel 
of the Belgian financial world whose main shareholder was the Belgian 
government, had to be sold to BNP Paribas to avoid bankruptcy.85  This 
takeover led to several legal proceedings initiated by aggrieved minority 
shareholders.  In some of these cases there were more than 2,000 plaintiffs.86 
Triggered by those mass cases, three proposals were made public in 2009 
and 2010 to introduce class actions in Belgium.87  The proposals were 
launched by the former Ministers of Consumer Affairs and Justice,88 the two 
Green opposition parties,89 and the Flemish Bar Council.90  At the moment, 
none of these proposals have been submitted to Parliament. In case the 
Belgian government decides to undertake action, it is most likely that the 
2009 proposal by the government will be taken as a starting point, as was 
                                                                                                                   
 84 Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Ghent, Sept. 20, 2010, NR. 1/VR/07.  The 
decision is available in Dutch at http://www.juridat.be/beroep/gent/index.htm.  
 85 This case is briefly discussed in Adrienne Coleton, Banking Insolvency Regimes and 
Cross-Border Banks – Complexities and Conflicts: Is the Current European Insolvency 
Framework Efficient and Robust Enough to Effectively Resolve Cross-Border Banks, Can 
There Be a One Size Fits All Solution?, 27 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 63 (2012) and John 
Goddard & Phil Molyneux, The Financial Crisis in Europe: Evolution, Policy Responses and 
Lessons for the Future, 17 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 362 (2009). 
 86 President of the Commercial Court of Brussels, Nov. 18, 2008 (A. et al. v. Fortis, SFPI & 
BNP Paribas), TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR BELGISCH HANDELSRECHT [TBH-RDC], at 902 (2008); 
President of the Commercial Court of Brussels, Nov. 18, 2008 (Deminor v. Fortis, SFPI & 
BNP Paribas), JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX [JT], at 703 (2008); Brussels Court of Appeal, Dec. 
12, 2008 (A. et al. v. Fortis, SFPI & BNP Paribas), JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX [JT], at 62 
(2009). 
 87 For a thorough analysis of these proposals see Taelman & Voet, supra note 30, at 333–42 
and VOET, supra note 3, at 169–75, 231–37, 295–98, 355–62. 
 88 Andrée Puttemans & Hakim Boularbah, Wetsontwerp betreffende de procedures tot 
collectieve schadeafwikkeling [Draft Law on Collective Redress Procedures], Apr. 29, 2010, 
available at http://www.tijd.be/massaschade [hereinafter Government Proposal]; see also 
infra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the government proposal). 
 89 “Wetsvoorstel tot wijziging van het Gerechtelijk Wetboek wat het instellen van een 
collectieve rechtszaak betreft” (in Dutch) – “Proposition de loi modifiant le Code judiciaire en 
ce qui concerne l’instauration d’une procédure collective” (in French).  See infra note 101 and 
accompanying text.  
 90 Patrick Hofströssler & Philippe De Jaegere, Wetsvoorstel tot invoering van Titel XXVI 
over de collectieve vorderingen in Boek IV van het gerechtelijk wetboek [Bill Establishing 
Title XXVI of the Collective Actions in Book IV of the Judicial Code], available at http:// 
www.advocaat.be/UserFiles/Positions/OVB-wetsvoorstel%20class%20actions%20website.pdf 
[hereinafter Flemish Bar Council Proposal]; see also infra note 104 and accompanying text 
(describing the proposal of the Flemish Bar Council). 
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announced in the media by the new Minister of Consumer Affairs in May 
2012.91 
B.  Government Proposal 
At the end of 2006, the Belgian Minister of Consumer Affairs, Freya Van 
den Bossche (a Flemish socialist), set up a working group to reflect on a 
possible class action in consumer affairs.92  Because it was not clear in the 
beginning what kind of action she wanted, the first outcome was a 
questionnaire containing detailed questions that had to be answered before a 
proposal could be drafted.93  At the end of 2007, Van den Bossche had to 
resign and Paul Magnette, a Walloon socialist, took over.  The class action 
idea received little attention for some time, but was resuscitated in early 
2009.  In a short period of time a proposition was made public in September 
2009.94  Immediately, the idea of American-style class actions made business 
associations shiver.95  The Federation of Enterprises in Belgium declared that 
it was going to do everything to prevent this kind of legislative initiative in 
times of economic crisis.96  Because of the Belgian political crisis97 and the 
                                                                                                                   
 91 Marjan Justaert, Slachtoffers straks in groep naar de rechter: Collectieve schadeclaims 
en groepsvorderingen in stroomversnelling, DE STANDAARD, May 3, 2012, http://www.stand 
aard.be/artikel/detail.aspx?artikelid=4S3PI01B. 
 92 Question de M. Dylan Casaer à la vice-première minister et minister de la Justice sur “les 
‘class actions,’ ” No. 14614 11 April 2007, available at http://www.lachambre.be/doc/CCRI/ 
pdf/51/ic1269.pdf. 
 93 This questionnaire was written by academics from the University of Ghent (Professor 
Piet Taelman, Professor Reinhard Steennot, and myself). 
 94 Government Proposal, supra note 88.  For an analysis of the proposal by its authors, see 
Hakim Boularbah, Des actions groupées vers l’ action de groupe: Quelle valeur ajoutée pour 
l’avocat?, in LA VALEUR AJOUTÉE DE L’AVOCAT 33 (2011) and Andrée Puttemans, 
L’introduction d’une forme d’action collective en droit belge, in L’ACTION COLLECTIVE OU 
ACTION DE GROUPE: SE PREPARER À SON INTRODUCTION EN DROIT FRANÇAIS ET EN DROIT BELGE 
24 (A. Legendre ed., 2010). 
 95 Bientôt une « class action » en Belgique [Soon a “Class Action” in Belgium], L’ECHO, 
Sept. 16, 2009; Rel over nieuwe wet massale schadeclaims [Agitation over New Law on Mass 
Claims], DE MORGEN, Sept. 16, 2009; België krijgt wet op ‘class action suits’ [Belgium Gets 
New Law on “Class Action Suits”], DE TIJD, Sept. 16, 2009. 
 96 Storme & Terryn, supra note 49, at 103 n.26. 
 97 After five state reforms (in 1970, 1980, 1988–89, 1993, and 2001), Belgium became a 
federal state, composed of three cultural communities (the Flemish Community, the French 
Community, and the German-speaking Community) and three economic regions (the Flemish 
Region, the Brussels Capital Region, and the Walloon Region).  See JOHAN VANDE LANOTTE 
& GEERT GOEDERTIER, OVERZICHT PUBLIEKRECHT 869–916 (2003).  The 2007–2011 political 
crisis was rooted in the increasingly conflicting views between the Flemish and the Walloons 
about a new state reform—the Flemish wanted to devolve more powers to the communities 
and the regions; an idea opposed by the Walloons—and the existence of the controversial 
electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) that had to be divided.  After the June 
2010 elections a consensus could not be reached, which led to a period of 541 days of 
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absence of a federal government for more than 500 days after the June 2010 
elections, the class action idea faded into the background.  In May 2012, the 
new Minister for Consumer Affairs, the Flemish socialist Johan Vande 
Lanotte, announced his interest in reviving the proposal.98 
The core of the proposal is a double pathway: a partially out-of-court 
settlement track (based on the Dutch Collective Settlements Act)99 and a 
court-based litigation track (based on the Quebecian class action).100  The 
double pathway is summarized in this scheme: 
 
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT   CLASS ACTION  
(NEGOTIATED OUT OF COURT)  (COURT BASED) 
 
 
petition for approval   introduction by petition 
 
 
     certification decision 
 
 
     possibility for parties to negotiate 
 
 
     agreement no agreement 
 
 
approval by the court    opt-out (or opt-in) 
 
 
opt-out (or opt-in)            decision on the 
               merits 
 
remuneration              remuneration 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
government formation.  For a good understanding of the differences between the Flemish and 
the Walloons see Robert Mnookin & Alain Verbeke, Persistent Nonviolent Conflict with No 
Reconciliation: The Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (2009). 
 98 Justaert, supra note 91. 
 99 See Government Proposal, supra note 88, arts. 17–24 (describing the proposed settlement 
track). 
 100 See id. arts. 25–38 (describing the litigation track). 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013  9:56 AM 
2013]       CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GROUP LITIGATION 453 
 
Both are real representative actions.  The class representative can act on 
behalf of a class of unknown fellow-sufferers without them having to 
intervene or opt-in.  Moreover, the settlement and the action lead to a 
decision that is binding on all parties involved.  
C.  Opposition Proposal 
A second proposal was made by the two Green opposition parties, Ecolo 
and Groen.101  The explanatory memorandum of the proposal makes clear 
that the mass disasters mentioned above illustrate the need for class actions 
in Belgian civil procedure.  After giving an overview of the different types of 
mass disasters (mass disaster accidents and mass exposure accidents), the 
point of departure of the Opposition Proposal with the Government’s is the 
deficiency of Belgian law to offer collective redress.  The memorandum 
recites the traditional advantages of class actions—access to justice, equality 
of procedural arms, procedural economy and efficiency, an enhanced 
settlement environment, the deterrence effect, etc.—and compares the 
Belgian status quaestionis with the recent legislative initiatives in the 
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden.  
The proposal suggests a collective procedure, consisting of two phases:102 
a collective phase, during which the common issues are resolved and the 
individual class members have to opt-in,103 and an individual phase during 
which the individual issues are dealt with.  Three justifications are invoked 
for this division.  First, during a long opt-in period, the class can be formed, 
meanwhile, and without any delay, the common questions can be resolved.  
Second, at the end of the first phase, the class will be formed and the 
common questions answered.  This enhances the possibility of reaching a 
settlement.  And third, a separate phase focusing only on the individual 
aspects of the damages, gives the individual victim his or her day in court.  
                                                                                                                   
 101 Opposition Proposal, supra note 89.  The proposal was re-submitted on February 6, 2012 
and is available at http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/53/2035/53K2035001.pdf [hereinafter 
Re-Submitted Opposition Proposal]. 
 102 Opposition Proposal, supra note 89. 
 103 The members of a class opting-in must deposit a declaration at the court registry.  This 
declaration must contain the identity of the individual, his or her contact information, 
documents that prove the individual falls within the scope of application as determined by the 
judge in the certification decision, a detailed statement of his or her damages, and documents 
proving those damages.  The declaration, which is irrevocable, must be done within the time 
limit imposed by the judge.  All declarations deposited after the time limit has expired are 
inadmissible.  See Re-Submitted Opposition Proposal, supra note 101, art. 1237/4 (describing 
the proposed requirements and procedure for opting-in). 
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D.  Proposal of the Flemish Bar Council 
A third and final proposal was made by the Flemish Bar Council.104  
According to this proposal, a class action must be brought before the district 
court.  A Belgian district court is a special court composed of the President 
of the Court of First Instance, the President of the Labor Court, and the 
President of the Commercial Court.105  The district court only decides 
jurisdictional disputes between different courts of first instance.106  The 
Flemish Bar Council wants to provide this court with a pivotal role in 
deciding class actions, but only in the certification and potential settlement 
phase.  If the class action is certified, the district court will refer the case to a 
competent first instance court that will decide the merits of the case.107  If a 
settlement is reached during the procedure, the parties have to go back to the 
district court for approval of the settlement.  The standard is low.  The court 
will only verify that the settlement is not clearly unreasonable for the 
victims.108  An important detail is that the non-binding advice of the Public 
Prosecutor is needed to approve the settlement.  With respect to the 
individual distribution of damages, the proposal allows the court to appoint a 
judicial claim settler or special master for that purpose.109 
E.  Main Characteristics 
The main characteristics of the three Belgian class action proposals are 
summarized in the table below: 
 
  
                                                                                                                   
 104 Flemish Bar Council Proposal, supra note 90.  For an analysis of the proposal by one of 
its authors, see Patrick Hofströssler, Waarom een ‘class action’ in België? Krijtlijnen van het 
voorstel van de Orde van Vlaamse Balies [Why Class Actions in Belgium?: Chalk Lines of 
the Proposal of the Flemish Bar Association], 54 ORDE VAN DE DAG 95 (2011) and Patrick 
Hofströssler, Een Belgische class action: de OVB schrijft, in LIBER AMICORUM JO STEVENS 
353 (Veerle Allaerts et al., eds. 2011). 
 105 CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] arts. 74–75 (Belg.).  
 106 Id. art. 642. 
 107 Flemish Bar Council Proposal, supra note 90, art. 1385-5. 
 108 Id. art. 1385-9. 
 109 Id. art. 1385-10. 
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III.  WHAT SHOULD A BELGIAN CLASS ACTION LOOK LIKE? 
A.  Purposes of the Class Action Device and Why the Current Situation is 
Inadequate 
The traditional objectives of class actions are access to justice, judicial 
economy, and behavior modification.110  The first objective is fundamental.  
“Class actions can enhance access to justice by opening the ‘doors’ of our 
courts to those with individually non-recoverable claims or whose claims 
would not have led to individual proceedings because of social or 
psychological barriers.”111  
At first sight, the Belgian procedural techniques (joinder of claims, claims 
in intervention, party representation, and the piggyback, or partie civile, 
technique in criminal cases) attempt to enhance judicial economy.  This was 
surely the ambition of the Royal Commissioner Charles Van Reepinghen in 
1967, when he drafted the Judicial Code.  The techniques of joinder of 
claims and claims in intervention allow all interested parties to deal with all 
of their claims in one single procedure, thereby avoiding multiple and 
sequential proceedings.112  Closer analysis reveals a more sober image.  As 
mentioned above, the techniques require class members to actively intervene 
(opt-in) in the proceedings.  Consequently, they do not work for small 
claims.  Because of the rational lack of interest and the negative cost-benefit 
analysis, class members will simply not intervene or come forward to give a 
mandate to a representative.  Moreover, the techniques require all class 
members to be aware of the proceedings before they can intervene, which 
requires broad notice.113  Therefore, these techniques will offer no collective 
redress at all.  
                                                                                                                   
 110 These objectives were saliently summarized in the Canadian decisions of Western 
Canadian Shopping Centres, Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can.); Rumley v. British 
Columbia, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184 (Can.); Hollick v. Toronto City, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (Can.);  
see also MULHERON, supra note 10, at 47–66 (describing the objectives of class action 
regimes).  John Kleefeld recently noted that “[b]ehaviour modification or deterrence . . . tend 
to be viewed as by-products of access to justice or as related to their effects on the ability to 
aggregate low-value claims. If you like, access to justice and judicial economy are the elder 
siblings; behaviour modification is the junior one – or even the poor cousin.”  John C. 
Kleefeld, Homo Legislativus: Missing Link in the Evolution of ‘Behaviour Modification’?, in 
ACCESSING JUSTICE: APPRAISING CLASS ACTIONS TEN YEARS AFTER DUTTON, HOLLICK AND 
RUMLEY 170, 171 (Jasminka Kalajdzic ed. 2011). 
 111 Vince Morabito, Ideological Plaintiffs and Class Actions: An Australian Perspective, 34 
U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 459, 502–03 (2000–2001). 
 112 VAN REEPINGHEN, supra note 37, at 327.  
 113 VOET, supra note 3, at 24.  The limitations of these procedural techniques are also 
recognized in the U.S.  See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN 
LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 644 (5th ed., 2001) (“Class actions, aside from involving many 
people, differ from such traditional disputes in many ways: flexibility of remedy, 
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But even in cases of larger claims, the aforementioned techniques do not 
fully achieve their judicial economy objective.  The fact that all class 
members have to intervene can lead to an uncoordinated and fragmented, and 
therefore inefficient and uneconomical, completion of the case.  This can 
cause an overloaded, even disrupted, judicial system.  Moreover, this mode 
of operation will trigger a race to the courthouse in cases involving a 
defendant with limited funds.  
Belgian statutory collective actions are injunctive or preventive actions.114  
Only the cessation or prevention of an illegal practice can be claimed.  It is 
not possible to claim damages for class members.  Therefore, the exclusive 
objective of these actions is behavior modification.  An individual victim of 
an illegal practice is not a party to the proceeding, and is not bound by its 
outcome.  If victims want compensation, they must initiate individual 
proceedings without being able to invoke the preclusive effect of the 
decision.115  Statutory collective actions do not offer victims easier access to 
justice or judicial economy.   
What is clearly missing is a tool offering optimal access to justice for 
victims of mass cases.  Neither the traditional procedural techniques, nor the 
statutory collective actions create credible access to justice for a victim of a 
mass harm.  Both the proposal of the government and the proposal of the 
Flemish Bar Council want to correct this problem by introducing an opt-out 
class action.116   
B.  Who Should Represent the Class? 
1.  Ideological Plaintiff as Class Representative 
The existing, but limited, statutory collective actions in Belgium can only 
be initiated by associations or organizations that satisfy certain legal criteria 
(e.g., having legal personality for some years, usually three).  Moreover, the 
statutory aim of these associations or organizations must correspond or 
overlap with the cause of action.117   
                                                                                                                   
predominance of administrative problems, an expanded judicial role, lawyers who must strive 
to protect many clients whose interests may diverge, and a greater concern with litigation’s 
effects on the real world.”). 
 114 Dalcq, supra note 57, at 168–71; Ramquet & Jones, supra note 57, at 49. 
 115 The claim preclusive effect of a decision only extends to the parties that were involved in 
the proceedings.  CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 23 (Belg.).  
 116 Government Proposal, supra note 88, art. 4; Flemish Bar Council Proposal, supra note 
88, art. 1385-8, sec. 2.  Both proposals allow the judge to impose an opt-in system when this 
would be more appropriate.  The proposal of the Green opposition parties is based on an opt-
in system.  Opposition Proposal, supra note 90, art. 1237/4. 
 117 See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the prerequisites for an association or an organization to 
bring a representative action on behalf of class members). 
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Contrary to the proposals of the two Green opposition parties and the 
Flemish Bar Council, the Government’s proposal only gives standing to 
associations or organizations to initiate a class action.  The proposal puts 
forward an ideological plaintiff as having: 
[N]o private cause of action or grievance against the defendant; 
[he/she] is permitted to commence a class proceeding on the 
basis that the class members’ interests will be represented 
properly and adequately; is expected to possess “special ability, 
experience or resources that would allow it to be an appropriate 
and adequate class representative”; and need not be a class 
member.118  
Contrary to the U.S., no standing is given to an individual class member. 
The choice of an ideological plaintiff (an association, organization, or 
governmental body, such as an ombudsman) is a good one for three reasons.  
First, when an ideological plaintiff initiates a class action, the focus from the 
outset will be on the class and not the personal claim of an individual class 
member.  This refers to the class-entity or class-as-client theory.119  The 
collective interests of the class members as a whole will be the decisive and 
motivating reason to initiate a class action.  During the proceedings, these 
interests will always come first, not those of an individual representative 
class member or his or her attorney.  Therefore, one may expect ideological 
plaintiffs to pursue class actions more strongly, with more commitment and 
enthusiasm, which will benefit the class members.  In other words: “The 
interests of the class are here likely to be much better served by an 
ideological plaintiff.”120  Moreover, time-consuming procedural problems 
                                                                                                                   
 118 MULHERON, supra note 10, at 303 (citing Arthur L. Close, British Columbia’s New Class 
Action Legislation, 28 CAN. BUS. L.J. 271, 274 (1997)); see also Morabito, supra note 111, at 
493–98 (providing a historical evolution of the ideological plaintiff). 
 119 David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
913, 917–18 (1998) (“The notion of the class as entity should prevail over more individually 
oriented notions of aggregate litigation.”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action 
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 370, 379 (2000); Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking 
Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 26–32 (1996); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, 
and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058–60 (2002); 
Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the 
Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1588–97 (2007) (describing 
the class entity theory). 
 120 South African Law Commission, The Recognition of a Class Action in South African 
Law ¶ 5.5 (Working Paper No. 57, 1995). 
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will not occur when the individual claim of the class representative becomes 
moot or is settled by the defendant.121 
Second, when an ideological plaintiff initiates a class action, no 
individual class member needs to come forward.  Thus, there is no danger of 
stigmatization and possible retaliation by the defendant.122  One should not 
forget that a class action is a complex event, not only because it deals with 
large-scale and sometimes well-publicized cases, but also because of the 
importance of the interests of the absent class members.  These members 
have to rely on the class representative, who therefore has a burdensome 
task.123  The complexity and psychological impact of a class action can easily 
scare off potential class representatives, or can hamper the procedure.  This 
is particularly important in cases of discrimination or violations of 
constitutional or civil rights, where class members are in an inherently 
vulnerable position.  Examples of vulnerable class members include 
employees, prisoners, members of a minority class, asylum seekers, minors, 
or victims of sexual abuse.124  All these problems are largely avoided, or can 
be more easily dealt with, when the class representative is an ideological 
plaintiff. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when the class representative is an 
association or governmental body, it will be easier to finance the litigation.  
This will be discussed further.125 
2.  Burns’ “Decorative Figurehead” 
The traditional U.S. idea that a class representative with a personal 
interest is in the best position to advance the interests of fellow class 
members is no longer convincing.126  A number of class action authorities 
agree that ideological plaintiffs are preferable to plaintiffs with a personal 
                                                                                                                   
 121 See Jean Wegman Burns, Standing and Mootness in Class Actions: A Search for 
Consistency, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1239 (1989) (analyzing mootness in a class action 
context); David H. Donaldson, Jr., Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the 
Federal Courts: Part One – The Continuing Impact Doctrines, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1296–
1300 (1976). 
 122 ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, 1 REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS 128–32 (1982). 
 123 Pierre-Claude Lafond, Consumer Class Actions in Quebec to the Year 2000: New Trends, 
New Incentives, 8 CONSUMER L.J. 329, 332 (2000) (“The responsibility involved in carrying a 
class action is very heavy – inordinately heavy for an isolated individual.  Alone against 
Goliath, the modern David of the judicial forum cannot share the burden he carries with 
anyone except his lawyer.  This burden constitutes one of the factors underlying the difficulty 
in finding a representative.”). 
 124 See, e.g., Stanley D. Davis & Kathy Perkins Brooks, The Employment Class Action: 
Recent Developments and Ideas for Discussion, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 109, 114 (2001). 
 125 See infra Part III.C. 
 126 Morabito, supra note 111, at 496. 
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stake.  An initial argument is that these individual plaintiffs do not actually 
control or direct the litigation.127  They are “merely a ‘key’ that the attorney 
needs to open the courtroom doors.”128  Although the U.S. Congress has 
made an effort to minimize the role of the lead plaintiff,129 class actions still 
remain lawyer-driven.130  
Second, it is argued that the fictional participation of individual plaintiffs 
introduces artificial and unnecessary issues of commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation.  In a pioneering paper from 1990, Jean Wegman 
Burns labeled the U.S. class representative as a “decorative figurehead.”131  
From a theoretical point of view, and partially caused by the dual 
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, the role of the class representative 
is ambiguous.132 
Apart from filling a space on the caption of the complaint, the 
purpose served by the named plaintiff’s presence remains a 
largely unanswered question. . . . [T]here is a general 
recognition that the named plaintiff is largely a figurehead who 
plays little or no part in the initiation and prosecution of the 
class claim. . . . The time has come to think about the 
unthinkable: eliminating the class representative.  He serves no 
function in the actual prosecution of the class action.  Yet his 
presence engenders confusion and the proliferation of phantom 
issues in class action jurisprudence.  Furthermore, having a 
                                                                                                                   
 127 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial 
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877 (1987); Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action 
Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning 
Class Action and Derivative Suits: A Rejoinder, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 458 (1993). 
 128 Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil: A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 311, 369 (2003). 
 129 For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) placed restrictions 
on which injured class members can serve as lead plaintiff.  “[T]he court shall adopt a 
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under [the PSLRA] 
is the person or groups of persons that . . . in the determination of the court, has the largest 
financial interest in the relief sought by the class.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I); see also 
Kendra S. Langlois, Putting the Plaintiff Class’ Needs in the Lead: Reforming Class Action 
Litigation by Extending the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 855 (2002) (extrapolating the lead plaintiff provision of 
the PSLRA to other types of class action litigation). 
 130 Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law 
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 432–33 (1999). 
 131 Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in 
Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165 (1990). 
 132 Id. at 168–202. 
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named plaintiff tends to obscure the fundamentally 
nontraditional nature of the class action and to divert courts 
from addressing directly the peculiar problems inherent in 
group litigation.133  
Third, the fiction of individual plaintiffs can undermine the goals of the 
class action device, in the sense that it can lead to conflicts of interest 
between the class representative and the class.  This issue is considered by 
the South African Law Commission.  
In fact the self-interest of the representative may very well 
defeat the interests of the class, as has happened in the United 
States when the defendant hastily settles the plaintiff’s claim, 
leaving the class without a representative.  There is a real 
probability that many plaintiffs with a self-interest prosecute 
their claims as class actions in the hope of pressurizing the 
defendant to offer a settlement more favorable than might have 
been forthcoming had an individual action been brought.  The 
interests of the class are here likely to be much better served by 
an ideological plaintiff.134  
Just like Burns, the Commission considers a class member as class 
representative as a mere fiction: 
Where redress is sought in the interests of [groups who are 
unable to initiate proceedings] it will usually be at the instance 
of some organization which has the interests of the community 
at heart, or possible some concerned individual.  Where this is 
the case there is no sense at all in requiring the concerned 
organization or individual to find a member of the group to act 
as nominal representative.  Such a nominal representative 
might be incapable of playing a meaningful role as 
representative for the group and one then has the situation 
where the concerned organization or individual is in fact 
driving the litigation but a pretence is kept up that the 
instructions derive from the named representative.  This 
presents the court with a fiction and forces the players into 
situations which are often not entirely honest and sometimes 
unethical.  There is nothing to be gained by insisting on a 
                                                                                                                   
 133 Id. 
 134 South African Law Commission, supra note 120, para. 5.5. 
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nominal plaintiff.  It the party driving the litigation is allowed 
to be the representative party despite the absence of a personal 
interest the court will know exactly where the various parties 
stand and will be able to make a valid assessment of the 
situation.135 
3.  Adequacy of Representation 
The question that arises is what if an ideological plaintiff, just like a 
natural plaintiff, does not pursue its own ideological interest, and whether 
that could be detrimental to the economic interests of the class.  Issacharoff 
and Miller observe that: 
[E]ven dedicated and idealistic people may not act as faithful 
champions when their guiding principles do not overlap with 
the interests of those they are assigned to represent. . . . The 
interests of nonprofit consumer organizations may reflect 
ideological considerations that may not necessarily coincide 
with the economic interests of consumers.136 
They suggest allowing associations and organizations to represent only 
their own members rather than all persons injured by the challenged product 
or practice.137  It is dubious whether it has to come to that, as long as certain 
safeguards are provided, since this restriction would limit the class action 
device that aims to offer access to justice and legal protection for all class 
members.  
First, standing has to be distinguished from adequacy of representation.138  
An ideological plaintiff having class action standing is not automatically 
                                                                                                                   
 135 Id. 
 136 Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 194 (2009).  They provide the following example:  
Suppose, for example, that an organization empowered to act as a class 
representative is committed to environmental protection – a noble aspiration, 
but not one necessarily consonant with the interests of a class of consumers 
who desire competitively priced products.  If this organization selects cases 
and litigation strategy on the basis of environmental considerations – going 
easy, let’s say, on companies that donate money to Greenpeace while 
vigorously pursuing companies that produce genetically modified crops – the 
enforcement of consumer interests would be skewed in ways that do not 
necessarily reflect the interests of consumers as a whole, who might prefer 
cheaper prices to greener products. 
Id. at 194. 
 137 Id. at 195. 
 138 See Hans-W. Micklitz, Collective Private Enforcement of Consumer Law: The Key 
Questions, in COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW: SECURING COMPLIANCE IN 
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adequate to act as a class representative in a specific case.139  For example, a 
Brazilian class action can be initiated by an association or governmental 
body.140  The mere fact that they have standing is sufficient; there is no 
additional inquiry into the adequacy of representation.141  According to Gidi, 
this is disturbing. 
It is generally feared that civil-law judges may not have the 
power, the inclination or the professional ability needed to 
examine adequacy of representation on a case-by-case basis.  
Although difficult to assess, control of adequacy over the 
representation of absentee’s interests may not be left 
completely beyond judicial scrutiny.  The role performed by 
civil law judges may differ, perhaps substantially, from that 
performed by common law judges.  It does not necessarily 
mean, however, that civil law judges are incapable of 
exercising some control of adequacy of representation, 
especially if they are supported by other devices.142 
By contrast, when, as a result of a mass case, multiple associations 
present themselves as a class representative, the class action mechanism 
should force the court to determine which association or body is most 
adequate to represent the class in that particular case.143  There should be no 
first come, first serve principle.144  In other words, the adequacy of 
representation test can obviate potential conflicts of interest.  If it is clear 
from the beginning that the ideological interests of the plaintiff prevail over 
the economic interests of the class, the judge can rule that the plaintiff is not 
adequate as a class representative.  If the conflict of interest occurs during 
                                                                                                                   
EUROPE THROUGH PRIVATE ACTION AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY 11, 21 (Willem van Boom & 
Marco Loos eds., 2007) (discussing the importance of the judge’s role in finding a plaintiff 
that is suitable to represent the class’s interests).  
 139 Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 136, at 194. 
 140 CODIGO DE PROTEÇAO E DEFESA DO CONSUMIDOR [C.D.C.] art. 82 (Braz.). 
 141 Gidi, supra note 128, at 367. 
 142 Id. at 371–72 (adding that “[a] proposed class action bill at one time would have given 
Brazilian judges the power to control adequacy of representation on a case-by-case basis.  
This approach was never enacted, but it offered a more adequate solution to the inherent 
problems of representative actions than the statute that was ultimately adopted by the 
legislature.”). 
 143 The court should verify if the interests of the association are sufficiently aligned with 
those of the class, the association has sufficient resources and willingness to use them to make 
the litigation succeed, the association will persist when it is in the class’s interest, despite the 
dangers of a loser-pays fee shift, the lawyer the association has chosen is sufficiently skilled 
and well-staffed to represent the class, etc. 
 144 Micklitz, supra note 138, at 21–22. 
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the procedure, the judge can substitute the class representative at the request 
of a class member or even the defendant.  
Second, attention should be drawn to the positive experiences with 
existing associations and foundations in the aforementioned Belgian mass 
cases,145 where they acted via the technique of party representation146 as 
representatives for deceived shareholders.  For example, in the L&H case 
more than 15,000 shareholders were represented by Belgium’s biggest 
consumer association and a large association defending minority 
shareholders.147  The general perception by all actors involved was that these 
associations vigorously defended the interests of their clients in the criminal 
case.148  Also, the fact that one of the associations financed the litigation 
proves that she prioritized the economic interests of her clients, over her own 
ideological interests.149  
Third, conflicts of interest can be restrained by self-regulating 
mechanisms that regulate the role and the behavior of special purpose 
associations in mass cases.  An example can be found in the Netherlands.  
The negative behavior of some special purpose associations in some mass 
cases,150 led to a Claim Code containing principles on the responsibilities and 
governance of such associations.151  The aim was to make those associations 
more transparent with respect to, for example, internal decision making 
processes, financial policies, and the composition and operating procedures 
of boards of directors.152 
C.  How Should Class Action Litigation Be Financed? 
With respect to the funding and financing of class action litigation, three 
options can be discerned: financing by the class representative, financing by 
the class counsel, and financing by a third party.  The three Belgian class 
                                                                                                                   
 145 See supra Part II.A. 
 146 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 147 See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text (describing the L&H case). 
 148 See the empirical case study on the L&H case mentioned supra note 82. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See, e.g., COMMISSIE CLAIMCODE, CLAIMCODE, 2011 (Neth.), available at http://www. 
consumentenbond.nl/morello-bestanden/716993/compljuniclaimcodecomm2011.pdf (appending 
J.H. Lembstra & R.W. Okhuijsen, Consultatiedocument ‘Zelf-regelering Claimstichtingen, 
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR FINANCIEEL RECHT, June 2010 at 158, 159–61 (discussing the Lipsick Effect 
Case, Hof – Amsterdam 7 oktober 2004, JOR 2004, 329 (Stichting Lipstick Effect/ABN AMRO) 
(Neth.), where two lawyers set up an association for the purpose of initiating a legal procedure 
against a bank, and the Woekerpolis affair, where concerns were raised about the revenues of the 
acting associations)).  
 151 In June 2010, a commission ‘Claim Code’ was set up by a lawyer and a communication 
advisor.  After a large consultation round, the Code was presented in June 2011.  Id. 
 152 Id. 
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action proposals ignore this issue, or deal with it in a fragmented and unclear 
manner.  A clear and comprehensive vision is lacking.  The only thing they 
all agree on is funding by a government fund. 
1.  Financing By the Class Representative 
One possibility to fund a class action is requiring the class representative 
to fund and finance the litigation.  This is already the case with the existing 
Belgian statutory collective actions.153  If the class representative is an 
individual class member, this means there will be no funding at all.  This will 
certainly be the case for small claims, but also for individually recoverable 
claims.  In those cases, funding a class action will come down to a personal 
and unprofitable investment, which no one will want to make.  If at the end 
of the procedure the class member runs the risk of also having to pay the 
costs of the defendant,154 there is “a disincentive to bringing grouped 
proceedings, and [this] might in fact create yet another barrier to access to 
legal remedies of the kind which the recommended procedure itself aims to 
overcome.”155  
Theoretical methods for creating greater incentives or pooling class 
member resources seem unlikely to succeed.  It would be possible to reward 
the class member who stands up as a class representative with a financial 
bonus, which would be an impetus to act.  Mulheron pertinently points out 
however, that this could lead to conflicts of interest. 
Where a representative plaintiff benefits from the class 
proceeding to a greater extent than the class members, and such 
benefit is as a result of the extraneous compensation paid to the 
representative plaintiff rather than the damages suffered by him 
or her, there is undoubtedly an appearance of a conflict of 
interest between the representative plaintiff and the class 
members.  This view holds that a class action should not be 
viewed as a method by which persons can seek to receive 
personal gain over and above any damages or other remedy to 
                                                                                                                   
 153 VOET, supra note 3, at 147. 
 154 See, e.g., Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 269, 274–77 (2001) (describing fee shifting in Ontario).  “The Ontario costs rule is 
problematic and causes difficulties because it raises the issue of who, properly advised, would 
agree to become a representative plaintiff.”  Id. at 275. 
 155 Australian Law Reform Comm’n, Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court 107 
(Report No. 46 1988). 
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which they would otherwise be entitled on the merits of their 
claims.156  
It would also be possible to allow the class representative to solicit other 
class members for financial contributions.157 This would be challenging, 
however, because the class representative would act on behalf of an 
unknown group of class members, who would be difficult to reach, and 
sometimes, to identify.  In cases of small claims, it would be hard to 
persuade them to pay for the litigation.  Therefore, Mulheron observes that 
this technique: 
is unlikely to be much utilised because of the disincentive to 
class member participation which up-front funding would 
entail.  In any event, . . . the practicalities are that any potential 
benefit is surely a bit remote at the time that this request for 
contributions is normally made, at such an early stage of the 
proceedings.158  
If the class representative is an ideological plaintiff, such as an 
association or governmental body, funding will be easier, because 
ideological plaintiffs, at least the successful ones, have more financial 
resources, such as membership contributions, subsidies, and other income.159  
Moreover, they do not pursue a personal interest, but only the interests of the 
class.  Because class interests overlap with their statutory aim, the class 
action goes to the heart of their existence.160  Ideological plaintiffs will 
therefore act as gatekeepers, because they likely will not invest in frivolous 
or meritless cases with the objective of profit. 
                                                                                                                   
 156 MULHERON, supra note 10, at 466; see also In re Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201, 
1209 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“If class representatives expect routinely to receive special awards in 
addition to their share of the recovery, the representative may be tempted to accept sub-optimal 
settlements at the expense of the class members whose interests they are appointed to guard.”).  
Under the American PSLRA, such awards are prohibited 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2012).  
 157 See Vince Morabito, Federal Class Actions, Contingency Fees, and the Rules Governing 
Litigation Costs, 21 MONASH U. L. REV. 231, 236 (1995) (discussing a proposal to have class 
representatives solicit other class members for financial contributions).  See, e.g., Class 
Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 50, s. 19(7) (Can. B.C.) (“With leave of the court, notice 
under this section may include a solicitation of contributions from class members to assist in 
paying solicitor’s fees and disbursements.”). 
 158 MULHERON, supra note 10, at 465. 
 159 See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 136, at 199 (comparing difficulties with individual 
class representative financing to organizational plaintiff financing). 
 160 See id. at 193–94 (discussing ideological loyalty of organizational plaintiffs). 
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That Belgian associations and organizations are possibly willing to 
finance this kind of litigation is illustrated by the L&H case.161  One 
consumer association, acting on behalf of its 4,000 members, did not charge 
anything.  The members pay an annual €150 contribution.  They were not 
charged an extra fee for the L&H case.  The legal support in the case was 
offered as a free service.  The only condition the association imposed was 
that their members had to retain their membership until the end of the 
proceedings, which made it a perfect excuse to work at customer relations. 
2.  Financing By the Class Counsel 
A second option to address the issue of class action funding is allowing 
the class attorney to fund and finance the litigation on the basis of a 
contingency fee agreement.  The attorneys’ fees could either be paid by the 
losing defendant (in countries that adopt a fee shifting rule) or by the 
prevailing class (in countries that do not).162  Contingency fees are strictly 
prohibited in Belgium because they violate public order and are incompatible 
with attorneys’ professional ethics.163  However, intermediate forms of 
contingency fee arrangements are possible.  An agreement, by which the 
attorneys’ fees partially depend on the outcome of the case, is allowed.164  
                                                                                                                   
 161 See supra Part II.A and the empirical case study of the L&H case, supra note 82. 
 162 See UGO A. MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE 
LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 691–95 (7th ed. 2009). 
 163 CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 446ter (Belg.) (forbidding a fee 
arrangement linked to the outcome of the dispute); see also Michael Faure, Fokke Fernhout & 
Niels Phillipsen, No Cure, No Pay, and Contingency Fees, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING 
CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE: A LEGAL EMPIRICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 33, 42 (Mark 
Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010) (discussing contingent fees in Belgium).  For a general 
overview of litigation costs in Belgium see Vincent Sagaert & Ilse Samoy, Belgian, in THE 
COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 217–38 (Christopher 
Hodges et al. eds., 2010).  See also COUNSEL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE, CODE 
OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS, art. 3.3 (2006), available at http://www.oa.pt/upl/%7B 
2f103317-16f3-4f86-9f8e-6d93d82312d9%7D.pdf.  
A lawyer shall not be entitled to make a pactum de quota litis.  By “pactum 
de quota litis” is meant an agreement between a lawyer and the client entered 
into prior to final conclusion of a matter to which the client is a party, by 
virtue of which the client undertakes to pay the lawyer a share of the result 
regardless of whether this is represented by a sum of money or by any other 
benefit achieved by the client upon the conclusion of the matter.  “Pactum de 
quota litis” does not include an agreement that fees be charged in proportion 
to the value of a matter handled by the lawyer if this is in accordance with an 
officially approved fee scale or under the control of the Competent Authority 
having jurisdiction over the lawyer. 
Id. 
 164 Faure, Fernhout & Phillipsen, supra note 163, at 42. 
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This comes down to a permissible enhancement of the attorneys’ fees based 
on success in the litigation. 
The fundamental problem with contingency fees and success fees in a 
class action context is that the class attorney acquires a personal interest in 
the outcome of the case, which is a breeding ground for conflicts of interest 
between the class and its attorney.  The class members are absent in the class 
procedure, but bound by its outcome.165  Therefore, the adequacy of the class 
attorney and the class representative is vital.  The class members are forced 
to almost blindly rely on the way the class attorney administers, deals, and 
settles the case.  The class attorney must also serve as a gatekeeper for the 
defendant, who has to be protected against frivolous claims and blackmail 
settlements.  In other words, the class attorney serves a semi-public role.166  
A personal financial interest in the case can hinder, and even impede, this 
task. 
3.  Financing By a Third Party 
Finally, third parties can finance and fund class action litigation.  This is 
possible through legal expenses insurance,167 such as before-the-event-
insurance,168 legal aid,169 a government fund,170 or more recently, third party 
                                                                                                                   
 165 Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 136, at 206. 
 166 VOET, supra note 3, at 141–42, 222–23. 
 167 In this context, one has to refer to the Eschig decision of the European Court of Justice in 
which the Court ruled that Article 4(1)(a) of Council Directive 87/344 on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to legal expenses insurance must be 
interpreted as not permitting the legal expenses insurer to reserve the right to select the legal 
representative of all the insured persons concerned, where a large number of insured persons 
suffer loss as a result of the same event.  Case C-199/08, Eschig v. UNIQA Sachversicherung, 
AG, 2009 E.C.R. I-08295; see also Jason Rowley, Eschig v UNIQA Sachversicherung AG (C-
199/08): Legal Expenses Insurance – Legal Expenses Insurance Regulations 1990, 1 J. PERS. 
INJ. LAW C32 (2010) (detailing the Eschig case). 
 168 Before-the-event-insurance (BTE) is taken out by those wishing to protect themselves 
against potential litigation costs that could be incurred following a usually hypothetical future 
event.  BTE insurance is generally paid on an annual basis to an insurance company.  After-
the-event-insurance (ATE) is taken out after an event to insure the policyholder for 
disbursements, as well as any costs should they lose their case.  See Marco de Morpurgo, A 
Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-Party Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 353 (2011); Francis Regan, The Swedish Legal Services Policy 
Remix: The Shift From Public Legal Aid to Private Legal Expense Insurance, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 
49, 50 n.4 (describing the two basic forms of legal expenses insurance: before-the-event and 
after-the-event). 
 169 See, e.g., HODGES, supra note 10, at 177–202 (discussing public funding for class action 
litigation in England and Wales). 
 170 See MULHERON, supra note 10, at 454–59 (describing the special public fund in Australia 
and Ontario’s Class Proceedings Fund).  The best example can be found in Québec with the 
Fonds d’aide aux recours collectifs.  More detailed information is available at http://www. 
farc.justice.gouv.qc.ca/. 
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funding.171  If class actions are to be introduced in Belgium, it is highly 
uncertain the Belgian government would provide funds for legal aid or a 
government fund.  If it is willing however, this financial intervention by the 
government will work better with an ideological plaintiff than with a class 
member as class representative.  An ideological plaintiff does not pursue a 
personal interest, but the collective interests of the group.  For a government 
fund or a third party funder, this can be a decisive and legitimizing factor in 
deciding whether to intervene.  The fund’s intervention will have a public, 
and therefore more acceptable, dimension.  Moreover, because of their 
experience and expertise with existing statutory collective actions, 
associations and governmental bodies have become serious interlocutors.172  
Compared to individual class members, they will be in a much better position 
to monitor and criticize third party funders in a way that will benefit all class 
members.   
Funding and financing of class actions by ideological plaintiffs or third 
parties are not ideal solutions.  The icing on the cake could be one-way cost 
shifting:173 when the ideological plaintiff wins the procedure, the losing 
defendant has to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs.  In case of a 
government fund, these costs could flow to this fund to finance future class 
action litigation.174  If the defendant wins the procedure, the ideological 
plaintiff is exempted from paying attorneys’ fees and costs.  This 
dispensation could be justified by the public interest in class actions as a 
legal protection tool.  
D.  What Remedies Should Be Allowed? 
Belgian statutory collective actions, as they are currently regulated, can 
only be used to obtain injunctive or preventive relief.  For example, the 1993 
                                                                                                                   
 171 See, e.g., de Morpurgo, supra note 168, at 352; Deborah Hensler, The Future of Mass 
Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
306 (2011); Michael Legg & Louisa Travers, Necessity Is the Mother of Invention: The 
Adoption of Third-Party Litigation Funding and the Closed Class in Australian Class Actions, 
38 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 245 (2009); Rachael Mulheron & Peter Cashman, Third Party 
Funding: A Changing Landscape, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 312 (2008) (providing summaries and 
examples of third party funding).  It is important to underline that third party funders, who 
take the risk of funding the litigation, work on a contingency fee basis.  If the case is won or 
settled, they receive a percentage (usually between 25% and 40%) of the compensation.  If the 
case is lost, they do not get anything.   
 172 Lafond, supra note 123, at 337–39 (considering associations as repeat players); VOET, 
supra note 3, at 151.  
 173 See e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee 
Paradigms from Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 125 (2003) (discussing cost 
shifting in a class action context).  
 174 For example, in Québec, the winning class has to turn the legal costs paid by the losing 
defendant over to the Fonds d’aide aux recours collectifs.  See supra note 170. 
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Act on the Collective Action for the Protection of the Environment gives 
standing to non-profit organizations to bring an action to stop acts that 
violate environmental regulations.175  The non-discrimination acts give 
standing to anti-discrimination associations to initiate an action to stop any 
discriminatory behavior.176  In neither example is it possible to claim 
damages on behalf of the harmed victims.  If class members want 
compensation, they have to initiate individual proceedings. 
The three Belgian class action proposals all allow claims for monetary 
relief as well.  In that sense, they enhance access to justice.  The government 
proposal contains a remarkable provision.  The class settlement or court 
decision can stipulate that amounts under a certain threshold will not be 
distributed amongst the class members, due to high distribution costs 
compared to the amount each class member is entitled to receive.177  This cy-
près-like technique178 is particularly important in small claims class actions.  
The proposal suggests depositing the non-distributed money in a government 
fund to finance future class actions.  This idea should be applauded because 
it allows taking away the illegal profit from the offender and using the 
money efficiently to finance other class actions.  Another useful and efficient 
tool can be found in the proposal of the Flemish Bar Council.  The proposal 
contains a provision that allows the judge to appoint a special master 
(judicial claim settler)179 to deal with the individual claims of class members 
out of court.180 
E.  What Role Should the Court Play? 
1. Which Court? 
A preliminary question that arises concerning judicial involvement in 
future Belgian class actions is: which court(s) should have jurisdiction?  
                                                                                                                   
 175 See supra note 60.  
 176 See supra notes 61–64. 
 177 See Government Proposal, supra note 88, art. 44 (describing the stipulation against 
distribution of monetary awards to class members). 
 178 See RACHAEL MULHERON, THE MODERN CY-PRÈS DOCTRINE: APPLICATIONS & 
IMPLICATIONS (2006); Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Près Relief and 
the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 617 (2010); Frances Howell Rudko, The Cy Près Doctrine in the United States: From 
Extreme Reluctance to Affirmative Action, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 471 (1998) (summarizing the 
cy-près doctrine). 
 179 For more on the use of special masters in class actions see David Rosenberg, Of End 
Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 
695 (1989) and Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary 
or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1986). 
 180 Flemish Bar Council Proposal, supra note 90, art. 1385-5. 
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According to the government proposal, the Brussels Court of First Instance 
and the Brussels Court of Appeal will have exclusive jurisdiction to deal 
with all Belgian class actions and class action settlements.181  The 
government proposal partially copies the Dutch Collective Settlements Acts, 
which makes the Amsterdam Court of Appeal exclusively competent to 
approve all class action settlements.182  
This will lead to a specialized and experienced class action court,183 and 
will pave the way for an efficient resolution of class actions.  A uniform and 
predictable jurisprudence will develop in a specialized area of the law (e.g., 
class action prerequisites and notice methods).  Moreover, a specialized and 
more experienced court will be able to deal with these cases more efficiently 
and swiftly.184  Because the total number of mass cases in European 
countries seems to be fairly limited, even in jurisdictions that already have 
class actions or class action-like tools,185 it would be inefficient to give 
jurisdiction to multiple courts.  One competent court also avoids time-
consuming litigation over jurisdictional issues and forum shopping.  
Critics argue that an exclusive, competent court can be very powerful and 
hinder the development of law.  It can also be perceived by class members as 
isolated, far, and inaccessible, which can lead to opt-outs because victims 
want to enforce their rights in a closer jurisdiction.  These dangers can be 
curtailed by a number of safeguards.  First, class action cases can be 
allocated, in first instance and in appeal, to a three-judge panel.  This allows 
discussion,186 and leaves room for development of the law.  Second, these 
class action judges must be trained.  Judicial education is essential. 
Judges need to be told that damage class actions are not just 
about problem solving, that the rights of plaintiffs and 
                                                                                                                   
 181 See Projet de loi relative aux aspects judiciares des procédures de réparation collective 
 [Proposal Relating to the Procedural Aspects of Collective Procedures], available at http://econo  
mie.fgov.be/fr/binaries/Class%20actions_Loi_modifiant_le_Code_judiciaire_avec_appe_tcm32  
6-77473.pdf. 
 182 BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [Dutch Civil Code] art. 1013.3 (Neth.). 
 183 See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 
1517–18 (2004) (“Specialized judges may develop expertise in distinguishing between 
frivolous and meritorious claims and therefore become more willing to sanction frivolous 
suits.”).  This is also in the best interests of defendants. 
 184 See id. (“Litigants faced with the same set of repeat judges may also obtain a higher 
degree of predictability of judicial outcomes, leading to a greater probability of settlement.”). 
 185 To date, there have been seventy-five GLO procedures in England and Wales.  Since the 
introduction in 2005 of the Dutch Collective Settlements Acts, there have been six cases.  See 
cases cited supra note 17.  In Sweden, there were eleven class action procedures between 
2003 and 2007. 
 186 VOET, supra note 3, at 310 (and references in nt. 1541).  Belgian law does not have 
dissenting opinions.  
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defendants are at stake, that responsibility for their outcomes 
lies not just with the class counsel and defendant but with the 
judge as well, and that what is deemed acceptable in one case 
sends important signals about what will be accepted in 
another.187 
This training can be organized on a national and international level.  A 
coordinating role can be reserved for the European Judicial Training 
Network that was established in 2000.  It is the most important European 
platform concerning the training of judges and the exchange of judicial 
knowledge and experience.  The goal of the Network is “to foster a common 
legal and judicial European culture.  [It] develops training standards and 
curricula, coordinates judicial training exchanges and programmes, 
disseminates training expertise and promotes cooperation between EU 
judicial training institutions.”188 
Finally, the exclusive class action court can be made mobile and become 
a traveling class action court.189  However, this is practicable only in small 
countries, such as Belgium,190 Switzerland, or the Netherlands.  It would be 
less convenient in larger European countries, such as France, Spain, Italy, or 
Germany. 
2.  Active Role of the Class Action Judge 
In this context, the adversarial character of Belgian civil procedure is 
relevant.191  The autonomous role of the parties in starting and ending a civil 
case on the one hand, and the active role of the judge on the other, are two 
important facets of this principle.  The parties autonomously set the limits of 
the dispute brought before the court.192  First, this implies that the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                   
 187 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR 
PRIVATE GAIN 497–98 (2000) (emphasis in original). 
 188 EUROPEAN JUDICIAL TRAINING NETWORK, http://www.ejtn.net/About/About-EJTN/. 
 189 For more on judge mobility see Randall D. Lloyd, Leonard B. Weinberg & Elizabeth 
Francis, An Exploration of State and Local Judge Mobility, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 19 (2001) and 
George Pring & Catherine Pring, Specialized Environmental Courts and Tribunals at the 
Confluence of Human Rights and the Environment, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 301, 328 (2009) 
(suggesting the creation of traveling courts and judges to realize access to environmental 
justice). 
 190 Belgium covers an area of 30,528 Km2 (11,787 mi2), and it has a population of about 
10.4 million people.  Cent. Intelligence Agency, CIA World Fact Book: Belgium, Mar. 15, 
2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/be.html. 
 191 See Jean Laenens & George Van Mellaert, The Judicial System and Procedure, in 
INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN LAW 83 (Hubert Bocken ed., 2001); Taelman & Voet, supra note 
30, at 309–11 (describing Belgium’s adversarial judicial system). 
 192 Paul Lefebvre, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 76 (Shelby R. Grubbs ed., 
2003). 
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delimits the object of the proceedings.  The judge is limited, but at the same 
time obliged, to decide the case as determined by the plaintiff.  Furthermore, 
a judge is not allowed to involve parties in the proceedings other than those 
designated by the plaintiff. This is important.193  When the judge ascertains 
that there are victims similarly situated to the plaintiff, he or she cannot 
instruct their intervention.   
Another feature is the active role of the judge.194  Once the parties have 
delineated the contours of the proceedings, the judge plays an active role 
with respect to the orderly evolution of the proceedings.  This means that the 
procedural rules should be respected and that a judgment should be rendered 
within a reasonable time.  Second, in case parties do not succeed in 
producing sufficient evidence, the judge is obliged to order a complementary 
inquiry consisting of, for example, the submission of certain documents, 
witness testimony, an official visit to the scene of the facts, and the personal 
appearance of the parties in the court.  There is no discovery in Belgian 
law.195  The judge is the key figure in the gathering of evidence.  
As his common-law counterpart, the civil-law judge is becoming more 
and more like a case manager.  This is an encouraging development because: 
the procedural treatment of a case should not be driven by the 
parties’ strategies, but should be taken in hand and controlled 
by the court.  It is the court that bears responsibility for the 
swift and efficient administration of justice, and therefore has 
to steer to case through the procedure . . . . The term [case 
management] suggests a new understanding of the judge’s role 
in civil litigation, his mission being not only to decide the case 
as the parties present it to him, but also to manage the caseload 
that confronts his court in a way that every procedure is dealt 
with in the most efficient manner.  It is clear that this implies a 
significant increase in the judge’s powers.196 
                                                                                                                   
 193 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 194 Lefebvre, supra note 192, at 76, 85; Paul Van Orshoven, Powers of the Judge: Belgium, 
in EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 291, 292 (2005). 
 195 Lefebvre, supra note 192, at 84 (“Belgian law does not contemplate preliminary 
disclosures, expert disclosures or pretrial disclosures, or written questions addressed by one 
party to the other.  At the most, a party can, in its written submissions, direct questions 
challenging the other party openly to respond, attempting by so doing to steer the debate and 
influence the court.  Lastly, Belgian law does not contemplate depositions for discovery.”). 
 196 Benoît Allemeersch, Civil Case Management: The Belgian Debate and Reforms, in THE 
XIIITH WORLD CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW: THE BELGIAN AND DUTCH REPORTS 237 
(A.W. Jongbloed ed., 2008). 
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Even more than in one-on-one litigation, class actions need judges as real 
case managers, for the simple reason that they have a public role in 
protecting the interests of absent class members and defendants.197 
Especially in the U.S., where class actions are still largely lawyer-driven, 
the judge plays a crucial and supervisory role in the relationship between the 
class and the class attorney.198  If the judge, acting as an active case manager, 
can safeguard the interests of class members and defendants, he or she can 
create public confidence in the proper use of class actions. 
3.  Keeping the Litigation Moving Forward 
A class action judge has two vital roles in class action law.  On the one 
hand, he or she is responsible for keeping the litigation moving forward.  To 
be able to act as case manager, the judge needs a range of management tools.  
The Belgian procedural tools that are used in individual litigation can be 
utilized in active management and steering of class actions: the possibility of 
imposing a binding procedural calendar,199 the possibility of undertaking a 
complementary inquiry sua sponte, the opportunity of having an interactive 
debate with the parties,200 and the possibility of imposing a fine in case of 
misuse or abuse of procedure.201  When class actions are introduced in 
Belgium, the utility of those management tools will have to be verified.  
Possibly, they will have to be adapted to be properly used in a class action 
context.  On the other hand, and this is vital, the Belgian class action judge 
will also need new customized tools, like his common-law counterpart. 
[T]he Court has been vested with the power to order the 
discontinuance of a class proceeding, to substitute a 
representative plaintiff who is not adequately representing the 
interests of the class members, and to establish . . . a sub-group 
and appoint a person to be the sub-group representative party 
                                                                                                                   
 197 Catherine Piché, Judging Fairness in Class Action Settlements, 28 WINDSOR Y.B. 
ACCESS JUST. 111, 111–12 (2010) (“Judges involved in class action cases have a tremendous 
responsibility toward class members and toward the public in general. They are asked to 
adjudicate the rights of numerous plaintiffs; importantly, the rights of absent or unnamed ones, 
according to their presumed interests.”). 
 198 Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 (1997); Richard 
A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 747 (2002). 
 199 CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 747, § 2 (Belg.). 
 200 Id. art. 756ter. 
 201 Id. art. 780bis; see also Piet Taelman, Abuse of Procedural Rights: Regional Report for 
Belgium – The Netherlands, in ABUSE OF PROCEDURAL RIGHT: COMPARATIVE STANDARDS OF 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 125–49 (Michele Taruffo ed., 1998) (discussing the abuse of 
procedural rights in Belgium). 
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on behalf of the sub-group members.  The Court needs to give 
its approval before a class action can be settled or 
discontinued . . . . Further examples of the interventionist role 
which the Federal Court is expected to assume are provided by 
[law] which allows [additional notice] . . . . But perhaps the 
most important provision . . . empowers the Federal Court to 
make “any order . . . [it] thinks appropriate or necessary to 
ensure that justice is done in the proceedings.”202  
The three Belgian class action proposals disregard the utility of existing 
management tools.  They all start from the rather naïve idea that the existing 
management tools can simply be transposed in a class action context.  This is 
not the case. Moreover, the proposals overlook specific class action 
management tools.  None pay attention to the possibility of additional notice, 
imposing additional conditions on the class representative or class attorney, 
or allowing individual class members to be involved in the procedure.  Only 
the government proposal contains a poorly formulated sub-classing 
provision.203  The possibility of limiting or expanding the scope of the class 
can only be found in the proposal of the Green opposition parties.204 
4.  Approving Class Action Settlements 
On the other hand, the class action judge is responsible for evaluating and 
approving any class action settlement.  This is the case in the U.S., 205 and the 
Dutch Collective Settlements Act.206  The Amsterdam Court of Appeal does 
not approve the settlement pro forma.  The Court can refuse approval if: (a) 
the agreement does not comply with the legal provisions;207  
                                                                                                                   
 202 Morabito, supra note 111, at 494–95; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(FOURTH) § 21 (2004). 
 203 See Government Proposal, supra note 88, art. 12 (providing for sub-classes in cases of 
mass loss). 
 204 Re-Submitted Opposition Proposal, supra note 101, art. 1237/5, §§ 2, 3. 
 205 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 206 See supra Part I.A. 
 207 BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [Dutch Civil Code] art. 7:907.2 (Neth.) (“The agreement 
must in any case include: (a) a description of the group or groups of persons on whose behalf 
the agreement was concluded, according to the nature and the seriousness of their loss; (b) the 
most accurate indication possible of the number of persons belonging to the group or groups; 
(c) the compensation that will be awarded to these persons; (d) the conditions which these 
persons must meet to qualify for the compensation; (e) the procedure by which the 
compensation will be established and can be obtained; [and] (f) the name and domicile of the 
person to whom the written notification . . . can be sent.”). 
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(b) the amount of the compensation awarded is not reasonable 
having regard, inter alia, to the extent of the damage, the ease 
and speed with which the compensation can be obtained and 
the possible causes of the damage; (c) insufficient security is 
provided for the payment of the debt-claims of persons on 
whose behalf the agreement was concluded; (d) the agreement 
does not provide for the independent assessment of the 
compensation to be paid pursuant to the agreement; (e) the 
interests of the persons on whose behalf the agreement was 
concluded are otherwise not adequately safeguarded; (f) the 
foundation or association [that concluded the settlement] is not 
sufficiently representative with regard to the interests of 
persons on whose behalf the agreement was concluded; (g) the 
group of persons on whose behalf the agreement was 
concluded is not large enough to justify a declaration by the 
court that the agreement is binding; [and] (h) there is a legal 
person who will provide the compensation pursuant to the 
agreement and he is not a party to the agreement.208 
If one or more of these conditions are not met, the judge can ask the parties 
to complete or alter the settlement.209  The Court can also appoint an expert 
to give an advice on the settlement.210  In the pending proposal to amend the 
Dutch Collective Settlements Act, the Dutch legislature wants to expand the 
role of the court.  The idea is to allow parties, before any approval procedure 
is launched, to summon the other party before the court when no settlement 
can be reached, in which case the court can act as a settlement facilitator.211  
The three Belgian class action proposals also pay attention to the role of 
the class action judge in approving a class action settlement.  In the proposal 
of the Green opposition parties, this role overlaps with the role the judge 
plays today in individual litigation.  He or she blindly approves the 
settlement, without the possibility of assessing the content of the settlement.  
Only when rules of public order are violated (e.g., a settlement in a custody 
                                                                                                                   
 208 Id. art. 7:907.3. 
 209 Id. art. 7:907.4. 
 210 WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING [Rv] [Dutch Judicial Code] art. 1016 
(Neth.). 
 211 Staten-Generaal, Wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, het Wetboek van Burgerlijke 
Rechtsvordering en de Faillissementswet teneinde de collectieve afwikkeling van 
massavorderingen verder te vergemakkelijken [Act Amending the Act on Collective 
Settlement of Mass Damage] Dec. 22, 2011, available at https://zoek.officielebekendmaking 
en.nl/dossier/33126/kst-33126-2?resultIndex=19&sorttype=1&sortorder=4.  The proposal also 
suggests making the Dutch Collective Settlements Act applicable in bankruptcy cases. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2013  9:56 AM 
2013]       CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GROUP LITIGATION 477 
 
case), can the judge refuse approval.212  The two other class action proposals 
are similar to the Dutch Collective Settlements Act.  The judge, who plays a 
more active role, can refuse approval if certain conditions are not met, 
although the standards are not as high as in the Netherlands.213  According to 
the proposal of the Flemish Bar Council, the court only has to verify that the 
settlement is not clearly unreasonable for the victims.214  Nevertheless, this 
more active role should be applauded because of the public role class action 
judges play in protecting the interests of absent class members and 
defendants.215 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The three class action proposals seem to indicate that on the political 
level, and within the bar, there is a consensus on the need for class actions in 
Belgium.  The question arises whether this is really the case.  Before 
answering that question, it is vital to distance oneself from the procedural 
issue.  Before proper procedures can be determined, the economic, social, 
and political course to deal with mass cases must be set out.  Looking at 
foreign examples, most legislators first thoroughly reflect on the broader 
context in which they want to embed a possible collective procedure.  
Commissions, working groups, think tanks, and the like are set up to conduct 
that reflection, to map all possibilities, and to list the desirable and 
undesirable consequences of all options.216  Only when a policy consensus is 
reached by all relevant actors, can the procedural issue be addressed. 
Although a working group was set up and the 2009 government proposal 
was written under its auspices, this reflection exercise was insufficient. For 
example, it is regrettable that nothing was done with the preliminary 
questionnaire, not a single report or study was drafted, and there was no 
scientific and broad debate including all relevant actors.  Instead, a tentative 
proposal was made public.  The same conclusion can be drawn with respect 
to the proposals of the opposition parties and the Flemish Bar Council.  
                                                                                                                   
 212 See Opposition Proposal, supra note 89. 
 213 See Government Proposal, supra note 88; Flemish Bar Council Proposal, supra note 90. 
 214 See supra Part II.D. 
 215 See supra Part III.E.2. 
 216 In Denmark, there was Recommendation No 1468/2005 of the Permanent Committee for 
Civil Procedure (Retsplejerådet).  Werlauff, supra note 7, at 203, n.8.  In Finland, three 
preliminary commission reports were published before an act was written.  Arto Lindfors & 
Leena Kerppilä, Introducing Class Actions in Finland?, available at http://www.gala-marketl 
aw.com/pdf/classactions.pdf.  In Sweden, the Commission for Collective Actions issued an 
elaborate report in 1995; and in Canada, the Ontario Law Reform Commission published three 
volumes of research on class actions in 1982.  ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra 
note 122. 
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Except for the traditional general observations, a thorough reflection on the 
broader policy is lacking. 
This course of events is symptomatic of Belgian civil procedure and 
Belgian politics overall.  Unfortunately, the most interesting discussions on 
civil procedural topics, and the broader policy in which they are embedded, 
always take place after new, and usually impulsive, legislation becomes 
effective, as was illustrated in 2007 when three major procedural reforms 
were enacted.217  The fact that five years later, two out of three acts have 
been “repaired,”218 is revealing. 
In addition, a holistic approach is required to tackle mass harms.  It is 
unwise to put all the eggs in the private litigation basket.  As already 
mentioned by Cappelletti,219 optimal collective redress can only be achieved 
by a matrix of intertwined models.220  Especially with respect to small 
claims, the potential for other redress mechanisms and models has to be 
underlined.  Moreover, priority has to be given to an alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) model that encompasses direct negotiation, conciliation, 
and arbitration by ADR agencies.221 In addition, the significance of 
regulation and possible regulatory oversight of collective restitution and 
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restoration222 cannot be underestimated, especially in Europe.  Nevertheless, 
and to complete this set of collective redress mechanisms, the private 
litigation model should include a class action device.  
In that sense, possible Belgian class actions should be viewed as 
additional legal protection tools.  From a procedural point of view, this will 
emerge in the superiority inquiry.223  Contrary to the U.S. counterpart, a 
European, and specifically a Belgian, civil-law judge will more easily accept 
the existence of other available methods for adjudicating the controversy, 
such as ADR and regulatory mechanisms.  Unlike the U.S., priority must be 
given to these alternatives, particularly with respect to small claims.  
Shaping class actions as additional legal protection tools comes down to a 
continuous quest for safeguards to level the playing field and correct the 
procedural imbalance inherent in group conflicts. On one hand, the absent 
class members have to rely on the class representative to enforce their rights.  
On the other hand, the defendant has to be protected against the power of the 
group.  Belgian class actions will be shaped differently than U.S.-style class 
actions because they will be embedded in a different procedural culture with 
different rules on standing, funding and financing litigation, and court 
involvement.224  Contrary to U.S.-style class actions, Belgian class actions 
must be initiated by an ideological plaintiff, cannot be funded on a 
contingency or success fee basis, and must be dealt with by one competent 
court.  Nevertheless, Belgian class actions will achieve the same objectives 
as U.S.-style class actions and will offer claims for injunctive and monetary 
relief. 
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